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1997 MarsdenLR 2145

HIGH COURT (KUCHING)

MUHAMAD KAMIL, J

WONG CHAU YENG
versus
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 42-17 OF 1996/II

Decided On : 02-19-97

MUHAMAD KAMIL, J

JUDGMENT

1. The appellant, an Assistant Enforcement Officer with the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Kuching was charged and convicted for an offence under section 4(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1961 (the said Act). Upon conviction, the appellant was sentenced to a one year imprisonment term and also ordered to pay a penalty of RM1,000/- pursuant to section 13 of the said Act.

2. In this appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted 2 grounds for the consideration of the court.

3. Firstly, the appellant alleged that the learned Session Court Judge misdirected himself on the burden of proof required in this case. The counsel submitted that, as in any criminal trial, the prosecution should bear the burden of proof throughout the trial. It [2] was further elaborated that the learned Session Court Judge proceeded on an erroneous presumption that the appellant has a burden to disprove the prosecution's case.

4. It is a clear and well settled principle of criminal law that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused person lies throughout on the prosecution. However, where there is a statutory presumption in the provision of the law applicable, as in this instant case, it then becomes the duty of the accused to disprove what the law presumes against him. In our present case, the said presumption is contained in section 14 of the said Act which provides:-

"Where in any proceedings against a person for an offence under section 3 or 4 it is proved that any gratification has been paid or given to or received by a person in the employment of any public body, the gratification shall be deemed to have been paid or given and received corruptly as an inducement or reward as hereinbefore mentioned, unless the contrary is proved."

5. It is pertinent to note that in order to invoke the application of section 14, it is imperative for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant herein was a person in the employment of any public body at the material time when the offence was alleged to have been committed and that a gratification had been paid or given to or received by him.

6. Since the appellant was an Assistant Enforcement Officer with the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Kuching, it should be clear beyond reasonable doubt that he was a person in the employment of a public body. Section 2 amongst others, defines "public body" as including, "any department, service or undertaking of the Government of Malaysia or a State".

7. Coming to the second requirement, the court must also be satisfied that a sum of money had been paid to the appellant. From his grounds of decision, it can be observed [3] that the learned Session Court Judge went through great length to consider all the relevant evidence before coming to a conclusion that the appellant did receive a sum of RM1,000/- from PW4, the complainant in this case.

8. As for the evidence on this point, apart from PW4, who said that she handed RM1,000/- to the appellant and received by him, PW5, the daughter of PW4 also informed the court that she saw the said transaction. In addition, PW8 and PW9, both officers from the Anti Corruption Agency (ACA) also managed to observe the handing over of the money by PW4 to the appellant. More importantly, a piece of evidence which clearly supported the factum of payment could be found in the answer of PW8 when he was cross-examined by the appellant. In one of his answers, PW8 informed the court that at the time when the money was handed over to the appellant, the side wind-screen of the car was wound down fully but at the time when the appellant was arrested after he had travelled for a short distance, the said wind-screen was wound up fully and the air-condition in the appellant's car was on. All these findings clearly undermine the appellant's contention that the sum of RM1,000/- was thrown into the appellant's car by PW4.

9. In the light of the evidence shown on record, the learned Session Court Judg

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