(delivering oral judgment of the Court): These three appellants were convicted by a jury at Alor Star on a charge for murder in contravention of section 302 of the Penal Code. The charge against them was that on the 31st of May this year at Lubok Batu in the District of Kota Star they jointly committed murder by causing the death of one Ismail bin Taib.

The prosecution case was that on the night in question somehow or other the deceased man came into the company of the three appellants and some other persons, that in the course of the evening the three appellants formed a common intention to kill the deceased and that in pursuance of that common intention one or other of the appellants struck him a severe blow with a large piece of wood causing injuries whereby he died.

It is not necessary for the purpose of the present appeal to discuss the evidence in detail beyond observing that the case against the appellants stood or fell in accordance with the view that was taken of the evidence of two prosecution witnesses who alleged they were present throughout, before and at the time of the killing and that subsequently they both assisted in disposing of the dead body

The defence at the trial as regards two of the appellants was the customary defence of alibi.

The prosecution case, however, depended, and depended entirely, on the evidence of two witnesses who in our view for the purposes of the treatment to be accorded to their evidence might well have been regarded as accomplices. If they were to be regarded as accomplices then from the point of view of the law of evidence their evidence should not have been relied upon unless there was what the law regards as corroboration.

In our view the direction given to the jury in this connection by the learned trial Judge although so far as it went it was technically correct was in certain respects inadequate. What he said was this:--

"An accomplice is one who participates in the commission of an offence.

Whether these two witnesses who gave evidence with regard to the

disposal of the deceaseds body and so on participated in this crime is

a question of fact for you, Gentlemen, to decide from the evidence. If

you come to the conclusion that they were accomplices then you must

look for corroboration of their evidence before you can act upon it

even if you believe them."

Now, there is not a word in that portion of the charge which is not technically speaking at any rate correct and supported by the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Davies v Director of Public Prosecutions [1954] AC 378, [1954] 1 All ER 507, 38 Cr App R 11, [1954] 2 WLR 343. In our opinion, however, as a direction to a rural jury in Malaya it was unduly technical. In our view the question of what amounts to participation in a crime should have been elaborated and expressed in simple language and for the better understanding of the jury they should have had explained to them the reasoning which lies behind the suspicion with which the law regards accomplices evidence, that an accomplice has an interest in minimising his own part in the events to which he speaks and in exaggerating the part played by the prisoner.

If the matter had gone no further than that we should not have been disposed to interfere with the convictions. But in our view it did go a little further because, again bearing in mind that a rural jury was involved, we do not think that the direction as to what amounted to corroboration was by any means adequate. There was indeed a certain amount of evidence which perhaps was not the evidence of accomplices and which perhaps could have been regarded as corroborative evidence. We think, however, the matter should have been more fully explained to the jury. In the case of Zielinski [1950] 2 All ER 1114, 34 Cr App R 193 it was held that there must not only be an adequate direction as to the necessity for corroboration but that th