1996 MarsdenLR 736
HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR)
JAMES FOONG J
JAYAKUMARI A/P ARUL PRAGASAM
versus
SURIYA NARAYANAN A/L V RAMANATHAN
PETITION NO S5–33–155–96
Decided On : 03-29-96
Balwant Singh Sidhu (Balwant Singh Sidhu & Co) for the petitioner.
Ravindran Neeko (Syarikat Radhakrishnan) for the respondent.
The petitioner was married to the respondent some 19 years ago; initially by way of a Hindu customary marriage but in 1992 had their marriage registered under the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 ('the Act'). There are two children to the marriage, both girls aged 16 and 14 respectively. The family resided at the matrimonial home which is a terrace house known as No 3, Jalan PJS 10/5, Subang Indah, Selangor. Residing with them is the petitioner's mother.
On 27 February 1996, the petitioner left the matrimonial home with her mother and children, and at the present moment are residing temporarily in her cousin's house. This was followed by the filing of a petition for judicial separation by her solicitors on 4 March 1996. On the same day, a summons in chambers ('encl 8') was taken out by her solicitors wherein she seeks the following reliefs from this court:
(a) that the respondent husband be restrained by himself, or his servants, or agents from molesting, harassing, threatening, abusing, assaulting or in any way disturbing her; and
(b) that the respondent husband be ordered to vacate the matrimonial home and not to enter therein until further order.
In her affidavit in support of this application, the petitioner claims that the respondent is a habitual gambler and an alcoholic which lead him to be an irresponsible husband and father of the children. This also caused frequent quarrels culminating to a stage that she can no longer tolerate his behaviour. On her instructions, a solicitor's letter was issued to the respondent exploring the possibility for an agreement to present a joint petition for divorce by mutual consent. In response to this letter, the petitioner claims that she was assaulted by the respondent followed by the use of foul and abusive language on her solicitors. The petitioner claims that things got worse when the respondent threatened to kill her, and informed the children to vacate the house for a few days as there will be a funeral taking place there. Out of fear, the petitioner left the house with her mother and the children.
The respondent denied the allegations of the petitioner and insisted that he has been a good husband and father by providing sufficiently for his family though on a fairly low salary. He claims that he did not assault the petitioner, but instead was assaulted by the petitioner's brother who had interfered in his matrimonial dispute with the petitioner. As regards the alleged threat of murdering the petitioner, the respondent explained that it was all a mistake. What he meant was that he was going to kill himself and the funeral in the house was actually meant for himself.
The respondent then proceeded to elaborate that he is a life insurance sales agent, and due to rising costs is forced to operate his business in the matrimonial home where there is the use of the telephone and computer. He needs the matrimonial home and the house telephone to conduct his business since his clients are already familiar with the house address and phone number.
When this application first came before this court on 18 March 1996, this court without difficulty secured a consent from the respondent to the first relief sought by the petitioner in respect of non-molestation and harassment. It is without doubt that all parties, particularly this court, deplores all forms of violence against a person. With this issue safely out of the way, this court shall proceed to determine the second relief claimed by the petitioner in encl 8.
There are two aspects to this second relief sought. The first is whether this court has jurisdiction, and the second is what are the principles to apply. It is obvious that the Act makes no provision for such relief. In the case of Chan Ah Moi v Phang Wai Ann [1995] 3 MLJ 130 , where a similar type of application was dealt with, the learned judge relied on the British Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 and cases decided thereon in the Englis