Ambrose J:

This was an action for negligence brought against a bus company by the legal personal representatives of a person who was killed in a road accident. They claimed damages in respect of his death for the benefit of his estate and his widow, daughter, son, and parents. The averments in the statement of claim were these: on 11 April 1958, while the deceased was boarding defendants' bus No SH 485 at or near a bus stop in Alexandra Road in Singapore, the bus drove off, causing him to be hit by a stationary bus; he died as a result of the accident; it was caused solely by the negligent driving of the driver and the negligent conduct of the conductor of bus SH 485; and they were the defendants' servants or agents. The allegations in the defence were these: the deceased attempted to board the bus while it was moving, full of passengers, and slowly overtaking a stationary bus; there was an accident which resulted in his death; but the accident was caused solely by his negligence and was in no way contributed to by the defendants' driver or conductor.

The first problem to be solved was: how exactly did the deceased come to be fatally injured?

The learned Judge after considering the evidence and stating the findings of fact which are summarised above in the head-note continued:

It is desirable to define the tort of negligence before passing on to the second problem. This tort is the breach of a legal duty to take care, which is either the sole cause or a contributory cause of damage to a person to whom the duty is owed. It is not necessary that the breach of duty should be the sole cause of damage: it is sufficient if it is a contributory cause. That is clearly the effect of the view of Lord Oaksey, Lord Reid and Lord Tucker in Stapley v. Gypsum Mines Ltd. [1953] AC 663. Section 3 of the Contributory Negligence and Personal Injuries Ordinance, which came into effect in 1954, would have no application unless the possibility that an accident may result from two, three or more causes is recognized.

The second problem to be decided was whether Ho Kok Wah, the driver of bus SH 485, was guilty of the tort of negligence. This problem posed three questions. The first was this: did the bus driver owe a duty of care to the deceased? This was a question of law. As was pointed out by Lord Macmillan in Hay or Bourhill v. Young [1942] 2 All ER 396, at p. 403:

The duty to take care is the duty to avoid doing or omitting to do anything the doing or omitting to do which may have as its reasonable and probable consequence injury to others, and the duty is owed to those to whom injury may reasonably and probably be anticipated if the duty is not observed.

Whether the bus driver owed a duty of care to the deceased in the circumstances in which the bus driver was placed depended on whether it was reasonably foreseeable that his acts or omissions would be likely to cause injury to persons in the deceased's position, that is, persons who might be waiting at the bus stop to board the bus driven by the bus driver. This, too, was a question of law. In my judgment, it was reasonably foreseeable that persons waiting at the bus stop to board his bus would be likely to do something foolish which experience shows to be common, such as boarding a bus while it is moving slowly at a bus stop; and that his acts or omissions would be likely to cause injury to such persons as might attempt to board the bus. In my opinion, he ought to have foreseen what was reasonably foreseeable. He was not entitled to assume that persons waiting at the bus stop to board a bus would exercise reasonable care. This view is based on the case of London Passenger Transport Board v. Upson [1949] 1 All ER 60, 70, 72; where the House of Lords expressly dissented from the ruling of Lord Greene MR, in the Court of Appeal that "drivers are entitled to drive on the assumption that other users of the road, whether drivers or pedestrians, will behave with reasonable care." Lord U