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1966 MarsdenLR 390

JUDGMENT

Wan Suleiman J (delivering oral judgment):

This is an appeal against the decision of the late Mr. Hashim J in which he dismissed the claim by the plaintiff/respondent. The defendant/appellant appealed.

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The brief facts of the case are that on the night of 1 December 1962 the plaintiff/respondent was returning home to Pasir Mas from Kota Bharu on the Kota Bharu/Pasir Mas road when at the 10'bd milestone, an oncoming Land Rover driven by an employee of the appellant/defendant knocked into the front bumper of the car being driven by the plaintiff/respondent. There were, as is often to be expected in cases of this sort, two varying accounts of what actually happened and, in deciding what the truth of the matter was, I feel that the proper thing to consider is not so much what the plaintiff/respondent said or what the defendant/appellant said but what the sergeant, whom I consider to be an independent witness, witness No. 2 for the plaintiff, had to say in this matter. The most important part of the evidence of Sgt 7291, Mahmud bin Awang Kechik, in my view, is that relating to a tyre mark measuring 117' 6'' which was admitted by both sides had been found on the grass verge on the Land Rover's side of the road, that is, on that side of the road on which the driver of the Land Rover belonging to the defendant company was travelling at that time. I consider that there can be little doubt that the tyre mark ending at a point where the Land Rover was found to have come to rest in the drain on its proper side of the road had been made by the Land Rover. That being the case I am of the view that the negligent party would be the driver of the motor car or the MG and in the circumstances I hold that the appeal should be allowed.

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There are two points of law on which I feel I should comment. The first is a statement made in the judgment of the learned trial Judge wherein he held that the doctrine of contributory negligence does not apply in this country. With that view I would respectfully disagree. The learned trial Judge has clearly overlooked the provisions of s. 12 of the Civil Law Ordinance, 1956. I must also disagree with the view which he held that in this case both sides had been equally negligent. As I said earlier independent evidence point to one fact; that the plaintiff/respondent was negligent. The other statement of law made by the learned trial Judge on which I feel I should comment is that part of the judgment wherein he said that the contents of an agreed bundle of documents must be proved unless such contents are admitted by the other side. With respect, I say that where there is an agreed bundle of documents there is no need to prove these documents. This rule is too well established in law to be doubted.

I, therefore, give judgment in favour of the appellant/defendant and in respect of special damages, having considered the value of the Land Rover as is indicated in the exhibit at p. 76 of the record and also taking into consideration the value of the Land Rover as scrap, I would award the appellant/defendant a sum of $2,000 as special damages. Only one item of general damage, I feel is worthy of consideration and that is the sum of $196 which I understand are the wages paid to the labourers of the appellant/ defendant company during the period of their medical treatment. I would say that the other items of general damages were either not proved to the satisfaction of this Court or were too remote to be worthy of consideration.

Costs in this Court and in the Court below will be awarded to the appellant. Deposit to be paid out to the appellant.

Barakbah LP and Abdul Aziz J concurred.

Appeal allowed.

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