Thomson CJ:

[1] The appellant in this appeal is the administratrix of the estate of one Gooi Kim Kwan who was killed in a motor accident near Sungei Siput on 21 March 1956. The respondent is the administrator of the estate of one Loke Ta Poh who was killed in the same accident.

[2] Gooi was a passenger in a motor-car which was being driven by Loke when it came into collision with a motor lorry and as a result of the collision both men were killed.

[3] It was alleged by the appellant that the accident was entirely due to the negligence of Loke and she accordingly sued for damages under the provisions of the Civil Law Ordinance, 1956. By reason of s 8 of the Ordinance the proceedings were brought against the administrator of Loke's estate.

[4] Letters of Administration to Loke's estate, although granted to the respondent on 4 November 1956, were not extracted until 8 August 1957, and the appellant's plaint was not filed until 17 February 1958. These proceedings were accordingly taken after the expiration of the period of six months prescribed by s 8(3)(b) of the Civil Law Ordinance which reads as follows:

"No proceedings shall be maintainable in respect of a cause of action in tort which by virtue of this section has survived against the estate of a deceased person, unless proceedings against him in respect of that cause of action ...

...

(b) are taken not later than six months after his personal representative took out representation."

[5] In his defence the respondent in addition to denying negligence pleaded that the action was barred by the provision of the Civil Law Ordinance which has been quoted, and in the event he took out a summons to have the point decided as a preliminary point under O 45 r 2. At the same time the appellant applied to the Court for an order that the time prescribed by the section be enlarged. Both applications came on for hearing before Mr Justice Barakhah who held that the Court had no power to enlarge the period of time prescribed by the Ordinance and held that the appellant's alleged cause of action was barred by it.

[6] Against that decision the appellant has now appealed.

[7] The terms of s 8(3)(b) of the Civil Law Ordinance are clear. The section states that no proceedings of the present nature against the estate of a deceased person shall be maintainable unless they are taken not later than six months after the personal representative takes out administration. The Ordinance itself contains no provision of any sort giving the Court power to extend that period.

[8] The case for the appellant, however, was based on s 47 of the Courts Ordinance which reads as follows:

"The original civil jurisdiction of the High Court shall be as set out in the Second Schedule hereto."

and item 12 of the Second Schedule which reads as follows:

"Jurisdiction to enlarge or abridge the time prescribed by any written law for doing any act or taking any proceeding, although any application therefor be not made until after the expiration of the time prescribed."

[9] It was argued that these provisions give the High Court power to enlarge or abridge any period of time prescribed by any written law for doing any act or taking any proceedings and in particular that they give the Court power to extend the period prescribed by the Civil Law Ordinance. It is, incidentally, a somewhat curious corollary to this argument that the Court has equally the power to abridge that time and so debar from his remedy a plaintiff who has commenced proceedings in this Court within the statutory period of six months.

[10] The learned trial Judge stated his opinion on the point in the following words:

"Item 12, my opinion, merely sets out the jurisdiction of the High Court, namely, the scope of authority to deal with certain matters expressly provided for by the law, and the Court could enlarge the time only where there was express provision in the law to that effect, .... In my view, item 12 does not give general power of enlargement to the Court."