Mohamed Dzaiddin FCJ:

By consent of the parties, this appeal was heard together with the earlier appeal in Soon Singh v. Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah & Anor [1999] 2 CLJ 5 as it involved similar point of law on whether the High Court has jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's application for a declaration that he was no longer a Muslim. The learned judge dismissed the application and adopted the grounds of judgment in Soon Singh. Hence, this appeal.

At the outset, Dato' Zaitun Zawiyah raised a preliminary objection that the respondent was not a proper party to the appeal. She submitted that under the Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984 (Act 303) the proper party should be Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan. We agree with her submission. Under Act 303, "Majlis" refers to Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan under s. 5 of the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1952 of Selangor, as modified by the Federal Territory (Modification of Administration of Muslim Law Enactment) (Order) 1974 made pursuant to s. 6(4) of the Constitution (Amendment) (No. 2) Act 1973 and in force in the Federal Territory by virtue of s. 6(1) of that Act. Part 11 of the Enactment 1952 of Selangor deals with the constitution, powers and obligations of the Majlis. Section 6 states that the Majlis shall be a body corporate having a perpetual succession and a corporate seal and s. 7 says the Majlis may sue and be sued in its corporate name.

In the above circumstances, we uphold the preliminary objection.

On the issue of jurisdiction, Encik Balwant, for the appellant, adopted his earlier arguments in Soon Singh's appeal. Dato' Zaitun Zawiyah, in reply relied on Md Hakim Lee V. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur [1997] 4 BLJ 419. She also referred us to Mohamed Habibullah bin Mahmood v. Faridah bte Dato' Talib [1993] 1 CLJ 264; [1992] 2 MLJ 793, which considered s. 5 of Act 303. The section states:

If for the purposes of this Act any question arises as to whether a person is a Muslim, that question shall be decided according to the criterion of general reputation, without making any attempt to question the faith, beliefs, conduct, behaviour, character, acts, or omissions of that person.

We note that in Mohamed Habibullah (p. 815) Mohamed Azmi SCJ applied the above s. 5 (on the test of general reputation) in determining whether Faridah had ceased to be a Muslim. His Lordship found no evidence except the statutory declaration sworn before a Commissioner for Oath to suggest that Faridah had effectively renounced her Islamic faith and thereby committed apostasy. The Supreme Court was therefore not satisfied that Faridah was not a Muslim or apostate at any material time. In the instant appeal, we do not think it necessary to consider or invoke s. 5 of Act 303.

Therefore, except for the fact that the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court Wilayah Persekutuan is conferred by the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 following item 6(e) of the Federal List to the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, in our judgment, for reasons stated in Soon Singh's appeal, this appeal is dismissed with costs. Deposit to the respondent to account of taxed costs.