1961 MarsdenLR 309
HIGH COURT (PENANG)
ACRJ (RIGBY), J
CHEAH SWEE HOCK
versus
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 5 OF 1961
Decided On : 03-21-61
For the appellant - Chang Min Tat; Chang Min Tat For Lombard Acceptance (M) Ltd. - Eusofe Abdoolcader; (Presgrave & Matthews)
Rigby J:
This is an appeal from a decision of the learned Magistrate, Mr. Ng Mann Sau, arising out of an inquiry held by him, under s. 441 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as to the right of possession of rival claimants in respect of a motor-car, bearing Registration No PA 5841, which was the subject matter of a cheating case dealt with in the Sessions Court, Penang, in which one, Loo Lean How, was convicted and sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment on 12 October 1960.
Before dealing with the arguments raised in the course of the appeal it is desirable that I should set out the relevant facts. Some time in May 1960, Cheah Swee Hock, the present appellant and a resident of Penang, bought the car Registration No PA 5841 from a Malay resident in Alor Star, Kedah, for $3,400. The whole transaction was effected through a broker, Loo Lean How. Cheah Swee Hock obtained possession of the car and all the relevant documents relating to the transaction. Loo Lean How then extended his services to Cheah Swee Hock by offering to go to the Registration Office in Alor Star, Kedah, to effect the transfer. This offer was accepted and Cheah Swee Hock handed over the car and the Registration Book to him for this purpose. What happened immediately after that is not quite clear. But what is clear is that subsequently Cheah Swee Hock, acting presumably under the fraudulent inducement of Loo Lean How, put his signature, in Chinese characters, to a formal Notice of
Change of Possession of a Motor Vehicle Form, in respect of the car. That Form bears the date 9 June 1960. The Form, when produced in evidence, bore the rubber stamp of "Lombard Acceptance (M) Ltd." in the space reserved for the name of the transferee. It does appear, however, that that stamp is superimposed over an erasure and it is open to doubt as to whether the transfer was executed in blank or whether it contained the name of some other person or transferee. Unfortunately, no one appears to have considered it desirable to ask Cheah Swee Hock, during the course of the inquiry any questions at all concerning this Form. However, armed with this Notice of Change of Possession of a Motor Vehicle Form, whether it was then in blank, or actually in his name, or already in the name of Lombard Acceptance (M) Ltd., together with the Registration Book of the car - which is, of course, prima facie evidence of title - and the car itself, Loo Lean How proceeded to the Lombard Acceptance (M) Ltd. and transferred t he car to that company, through one of its responsible representatives. He then entered into a Hire-Purchase Agreement with the company in respect of the car. The company agreed to the car being transferred into his name, subject to an endorsement that it was itself the registered owner of the car. The prescribed forms required under the Road Transport Regulations were duly filled in and subsequently sent to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, Penang, and later produced in evidence during the course of the inquiry. Subsequently, Loo Lean How fell into arrears with the payment of the instalments under the Hire-Purchase Agreement and the company, after having sent him a letter dated 16 September 1960, notifying him, that unless the arrears were paid within seven days they would terminate the agreement, on his failure to pay, did, in fact, terminate the agreement. Whether they in fact resumed possession of the car before the actual resumption of possession is not entirely clear. However, the fraud was discovered and Loo Lean How was prosecuted to conviction.
The question then arose as to who was to have possession of the car, Cheah Swee Hock or the Lombard Acceptance (M) Ltd. The matter was apparently referred to the Magistrate to hold an inquiry under s. 441 of the Criminal Procedure Code. He did so, and held that the company was entitled to possession of the car. He based his decision on two separate and distinct grounds. First, he held that the company was a purchaser in good faith a