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1963 MarsdenLR 211

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR)

AMBROSE, J


HIN SENG & CO
versus
SEAC CO

SUIT NO. 1039 OF 1962

Decided On : 01-24-63

Advocates:
For the plaintiffs - KC Chan (Peter Lee with him); SK Lee For the defendants - RC Hoffman; (Allen & Gledhill)

JUDGMENT

Ambrose J:

The defendants are the tenants of the whole premises known as No. 11 Phillip Street, Singapore, the standard rent of which is $137.50 per month. They let an unfurnished room on the ground floor of the premises to the plaintiffs at a rent of $190 per month, inclusive of municipal charges, commencing from 16 September 1955. On the application of the plaintiffs for apportionment of the rent of the whole premises and determination of the rent of the room under s. 22 of the Control of Rent Ordinance (Cap. 242), the Rent Conciliation Board, on 3 July 1962, fixed the rent of the room at $35 per month, inclusive of municipal charges, with effect from 1 July 1962.

The plaintiffs now seek to recover from the defendants the difference between $190 and $35 per month for the period of 81 months from 16 September 1955 to 15 June 1962. This amounts to $12,555. It is alleged that this sum was received by the defendants in excess of the rent lawfully receivable by them in respect of the room. The claim is made under s. 3(4) and or s. 22 of the Control of Rent Ordinance (Cap. 242).

Section 3(4) reads as follows:

A tenant who has paid his landlord a sum in excess of the rent which may lawfully be received under the provisions of this section may recover such sum from the landlord.

Section 3(1) provides as follows:

....... it shall be unlawful for any landlord...... to receive .... a rent in respect of any tenancy of premises in excess of the rent fixed by an order of the Board, or, if no order has been made, in excess of the standard rent.

The rent which may lawfully be received by a landlord under s. 3(1) is, therefore, the rent fixed by an order of the Board, or, if no order has been made, the standard rent. The order fixing the rent of the room was not made by the Board until 3 July 1962. The question arises whether the defendants received a rent in excess of the standard rent for 81 months prior to that date. According to s. 2 of the Ordinance, "standard rent" means:

(a) if the rent has been fixed by the Board prior to the commencement of this Ordinance, the rent so fixed;

(b) if the rent has not been fixed by the Board prior to the commencement of this Ordinance, the rent of the premises as at 1 August 1939; or in the case of premises which were then unlet, unoccupied or unbuilt, the rent at which the premises were first let after 1 August 1939.

According to s. 2, "premises" means "any dwelling house,........ office...... shop...... and any other building...... in which persons are employed or work and any part of any such building let or sublet separately...... but does not include any new building built or completed after 7 September 1947.

The Ordinance came into force on 20 July 1953. It is not disputed that the room was not let on 1 August 1939; and that it was first let on 16 September 1955, at a rent of $190 per month. In my opinion, this was the standard rent of the room; and the defendants did not, therefore, receive any rent in excess of the standard rent during the period of 81 months.

The first contention of Counsel for the plaintiffs is that the rent which was lawfully receivable by the defendants in respect of the room during the period of 81 months was the rent of $35 per month which was fixed by the Board on 3 July 1962. This contention is based on the proposition that the apportionment of rent made by the Board was retrospective. The authority cited for this proposition is Kimm v. Cohen [1923] 40 TLR 123. In that case, the plaintiff in March 1921, let three rooms in a house to the defendant at a weekly rent of 20s. At the time of the letting the standard rent of the three rooms had not been ascertained. In January 1923, the plaintiff sued the defendant for arrears of rent amounting to STG11. The County Court held that the onus was on the defendant to prove the standard rent, and adjourned the hearing to enable the defendant to obtain an apportionment under s. 12(3) of the Increase of Rent and M

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