1958 MarsdenLR 151
HIGH COURT (IPOH)
SYED SHEH BARAKBAH, J
LEE LEE CHENG
versus
SEOW PENG KWANG
CIVIL SUIT NO 43 OF 1958
Decided On : 10-27-58
For the plaintiff - P Dharmananda; Murphy Dunbar & Chung (Singapore) For the defendant - WJ Huntsman; (Maxwell, Kenion, Cowdy & Jones)
Syed Sheh Barakbah J:
The plaintiff in this case is the widow and Administrator of the Estate of Gooi Kim Kwan alias Gooi Kim Kwai, deceased. She is suing the defendant, who is the Administrator of Loke Ta Poh, deceased, for damages for negligent driving. In para. 6(e) of his Statement of Defence, the defendant states "that in any event the plaintiff's action was not commenced before the expiration of six months from the date on which the defendant took out representation to the estate of Loke Ta Poh, deceased, and the plaintiff's alleged cause of action is barred by the provision of s. 8(3)(b) of the Civil Law Ordinance, 1956.
The facts of the case briefly are that on 21 March 1956, Gooi Kim Kwan alias Gooi Kim Kwai was travelling as a passenger in a motor car along Sungei Siput at or near the 13th milestone Sungei Siput-Chemor Road, Perak, when the car in which he was travelling came into collision with a motor lorry No AA 797, which was travelling in the opposite direction. In consequence of the said collision both the driver, Loke Ta Poh, and Gooi Kim Kwan alias Gooi Kim Kwai were killed.
Letters of Administration to the estate of Gooi Kim Kwan alias Gooi Kim Kwai deceased, were granted to the plaintiff on 19 February 1957 and the grant was extracted on 11 November 1957. Letters of Administration to the estate of the driver, Lake Ta Poh, deceased, were granted to the defendant on 4 November 1956 and the grant was extracted on 8 August 1957.
The Plaint was filed by the plaintiff and admitted by the Court on 17 February 1958.
On 29 July 1958 the defendant filed an application by way of Summons in Chambers for an order that the point of law raised by him in para. 6(e) of his defence be set down for hearing and disposed of before the trial, and on 9 September 1958 the plaintiff by Notice of Motion applied for an order that the time prescribed by s. 8(3)(b) of the Civil Law Ordinance No. 5 of 1956 be enlarged so as to validate the proceedings in the above action, or, alternatively to enable new proceedings to be instituted in respect of the causes of action in which these proceedings have been instituted.
As the application in Summons in Chambers was connected with the Motion, I adjourned the application in Chambers to open Court and dealt with it together with the Motion.
The questions before the Court were, first, whether the action was barred by limitation as prescribed by s. 8(3)(b), Civil Law Ordinance; secondly, whether action should be brought not later than six months after the grant of Letters of Administration or after extract of grant of Letters of Administration; and, thirdly, whether this Court has jurisdiction to enlarge the time so as to validate the proceedings in the above action.
I will deal with the last question first.
Section 8(3)(b), Civil Law Ordinance, states:
8 (3) No proceedings shall be maintainable in respect of a cause of action in tort which by virtue of this section has survived against the estate of a deceased person, unless proceedings against him in respect of that cause of action either-
(a) were pending at the date of his death; or
(b) are taken not later than six months after his personal representative took out representation.
Letters of Administration to the estate of Loke Ta Poh, deceased, were granted to the defendant on 4 November 1956 and the grant was extracted on 8 August 1957. This action was instituted on 17 February 1958. Now, assuming that the time prescribed by s. 8(3)(b), Civil Law Ordinance, 1956, commenced to run against the plaintiff on 8 August 1957 - the day the grant was extracted - the plaintiff's suit would become statute barred on or about 10 February 1958. As the action was filed on 17 February 1958 the plaintiff was a week late, and, therefore, the action was barred by limitation. This was admitted by the plaintiff in his affidavit dated 5 September 1958.
Now, what I have to decide is whether this Court has power to enlarge the time. Mr. Dharman