Taylor J:

The facts and argument sufficiently appear from the Judgment.

Ch'ng Tiam Swee died intestate at Pulau Ketam, Selangor, on 10 May 1949 leaving three lots of Mukim Register land.

On 16 December 1949 his eldest son filed in the High Court at Kuala Lumpur a petition for letters of administration in which the net value of the estate was sworn at a little more than $3,000.

By s. 178 of the Probate and Administration Enactment, Cap. 8, the Collector of Land Revenue has exclusive jurisdiction over "small estates", which are defined as estates including some immovable property and not exceeding $3,000 in total value.

On 31 December 1949 this limit was raised to $5,000 by the Administration of Small Estates Ordinance, 1949.

On 5 January 1950 the petition came before the Senior Assistant Registrar who held that the estate was then a "small estate". As the amending Ordinance contains no saving clause regarding pending applications he doubted whether the Court could deal with the petition and adjourned the matter.Later, he formally referred the question to a Judge for a decision, and as several cases involving a similar question had arisen, the Chief justice invited the Attorney General to take part in the argument.

When the matter came before me on 25 February Mr. Brodie, Federal Counsel, who appeared on behalf of the Attorney General expressed doubt as to whether an amicus curiae can be heard in chambers but I am able to assure him, from my own experience, that there is ample local precedent for this.

I will deal first with a preliminary point which was not argued.The definition of "small estate" in s. 177 Cap. 8 in the Revised Edition runs:

"....... an intestate consisting .... of immovable property", the word "estate" which appeared after "intestate", in the original Enactment of 1926, being omitted.

An intestate cannot consist of land.If the present statute is construed literally, the definition is incapable of any meaning and the whole chapter is abolished.It is matter for comment that, although the section has been amended on three separate occasions, this omission has not been repaired.

In a statute to which the rules of strict construction apply, omitted words cannot be supplied and, in strictness, one cannot prefer the original because the revised edition is, by express enactment, the sole authentic text.However, I am of opinion that this Chapter is susceptible of beneficial construction and since the omission of the word "estate" would make the whole chapter inoperative if the definition were literally construed, I think the Court will supply the missing word from the original statute.

I now pass on to the principal arguments addressed to me on the question reserved by the Registrar.

Mr. Ng Kok Thoy for the petitioner, submitted that the provisions of the Courts Ordinance, 1949 prevail over those of the Probate Enactment by virtue of s. 109 of the former.

In my view this section does not apply because there is no inconsistency or conflict.The jurisdiction of the Collector is very artificially circumscribed.It is exclusive but it is limited to estates which are not merely small in value but are intestate and also include land.If the deceased leaves a will or if he leaves movables only, the Court has exclusive jurisdiction, no matter how small the estate (though it might happen that if a will were held to be invalid an entirely new proceeding before the Collector would become necessary).

Counsel argued that there are two parallel jurisdictions and that the petitioner can choose his forum.This is not correct.

There are two separate jurisdictions for different classes of estates of small value - with a highly technical and artificial line, but nevertheless a clearly marked line, between them.There is no overlap.

Mr. Kok Thoy also submitted that the question here is one of jurisdiction and rights, not of procedure, and that the amendment is therefore not retrospective.He referred to Maxwell (IX Edn.) at p. 221 and