This is an appeal by the Public Prosecutor against the decision of the President Sessions Court, Melaka, wherein he acquitted and discharged the respondent on the 1st and 2nd charges at the close of the prosecution case and the 3rd charge at the conclusion of the defence case.

The respondent was the former headmaster of the Merlimau English School. As a headmaster he was also ex officio Secretary to the Board of Managers of the school. It was his duty to maintain account books, to collect moneys from government and private sources and credit them into the school accounts; to make out various cheques for teachers salaries and teaching allowances. He was also authorised to draw out and expend money for other activities connected with the school. In fact, with his practical involvement and experience, his superior knowledge and authority in the school plus the implicit trust the Chairman of the Board, a retired P.W.D. technician, had on him, gave the respondent an almost complete domain over the financial affairs of the school. Cheques for payment out from the school would normally be accompanied by vouchers prepared by the respondent, but whether supported by vouchers or not, the Chairman would nevertheless sign them. Such was the influence of the respondent on the Chairman. It may be fair to say that in some ways the Chairman was blissfully and helplessly ignorant of the financial dealings when he set his signature on the cheques.

Anyway he remembered signing a cheque for $ 127.77 (subject-matter of the 1st charge). The cheque was not accompanied by any voucher. This was subsequently found to be signed by the respondent himself and no mention was made in the column provided of the purpose of such a payment. The cheque was proved by the prosecution to have been subsequently paid by the respondent to Wearne Brothers as the monthly instalment towards the hire purchase of his wifes car.

Another cheque of $ 225 (subject-matter of the 2nd charge) was paid out in exactly similar circumstances.

The Chairman also recalled signing a third cheque dated December 3, 1971 for $ 1,964 (subject-matter of the 3rd charge). The cheque was filled up in the respondents own handwriting and was brought to the Chairman by the school peon.

It may be convenient at this stage to deal first with the 1st and 2nd charges. Now, as mentioned earlier, the learned President had acquitted and discharged the respondent on these charges at the close of the prosecution case. The grounds which have prompted the President in doing so ran through an entire 5 foolscap typewritten pages but which, in the laconic language of counsel for the respondent, meant the absence of two vital ingredients, i.e. entrustment and intention. But the most vital issues raised by counsel is the competence of this court to hear an appeal which has been filed out of time. The respondent was acquitted on the first two charges at the close of the prosecution case on July 15, 1978. Defence was called in respect of the 3rd charge only, on which he was finally acquitted on November 6, 1978. The appellant filed an appeal on November 14, 1978 on all the charges. Although the appeal in respect of the 3rd charge was filed within the 10 days period as prescribed under section 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it was not so in respect of the 1st two charges. Section 307(i) reads:

"Except in a case to which section 304 applies and subject to the

provisions of sections 305 and 306 any person who is dissatisfied with

any judgment sentence or order pronounced by any Magistrates Court in

a criminal case ... may prefer an appeal to a court of a judge against

such judgment, sentence or order ... by lodging within ten days from

the time of such judgment, sentence or order being passed or made, with

the clerk of such Magistrates Court a notice of appeal in triplicate.

..."

It is perceivable from the records here that the orders acquittin