(delivering the Judgement of the Court): This was an appeal by the Malaysian Bar against the decision of the High Court at Kuala Lumpur in allowing the petition of Encik Mutang Tagal for admission and enrolment as an advocate and solicitor of the High Court Malaya. The main issue that arose for determination was whether his period of pupillage in the State of Sarawak was valid for the purpose of complying with the requirement of section 13(1) Legal Profession Act, 1976 having regard to the definition of "advocate and solicitor" in section 3 of the said Act. We had allowed the appeal and made no order as to costs. We now give our reasons.

In June 1980, Encik Mutang Tagal, a Malaysian citizen, passed the final examination for the degree of Bachelor of Laws held by the University of Malaya. He then attended and served a 12-month period of pupillage from February 23, 1981 to February 23, 1982 in the office of Mr. Peter Chin Fah Kui of Messrs Wan Ullok Jugah Chin & Co. at Miri, Sarawak. On February 24, 1982, he filed a petition in the High Court Borneo at Kuching for admission as an advocate under the Advocates Ordinance of Sarawak (Cap. 110) and on April 28, 1982 his petition was granted by the Chief Justice Borneo. He then filed the present petition dated August 19, 1983 for admission and enrolment as an advocate and solicitor of the High Court Malaya under sections 10 and 15 of the Legal Profession Act, 1976. The petition was objected to by the Malaysian Bar and by virtue of amendment by Act A567 to section 16(3), the petition was heard before a single judge instead of three judges of the High Court.

Notice of Objection by the Malaysian Bar contained two grounds, but for the purpose of this appeal we need only state the first ground viz:

"That the Petitioner has failed to comply with Sections 12 and 13 of the Legal Profession Act, 1976 in that he has failed to serve a period of pupillage with an Advocate & Solicitor who has been in active practice in Malaysia for a total period of not less than seven years."

But both here and in the court below, the issue had been narrowed down to the interpretation of the words "advocate and solicitor" in section 13(1) in the light of their definition under section 3 of the Legal Profession Act. In overruling the objection of the Malaysian Bar, the learned Judge felt bound by the Judgment of this court in Samantha Murthi v Attorney-General [1982]2 MLJ 126 and after quoting a passage from the judgment of Suffian L.P. the learned Judge had this to say:—

"I would like to repeat the opinion of the Federal Court that the intention of the legislature is to treat Sabah, Sarawak and West Malaysia as one country for the purpose of pupillage. The Federal Court went on to say: 'In our judgment the legislature must be regarded as manifesting the same intention when choosing the word Malaysia in section 13(1) of the Legal Profession Act'. That, in my opinion, is as good as saying that the legislature must be regarded as manifesting the same intention when enacting section 13(1) of the Legal Profession Act. Therefore I feel bound by that opinion of the Federal Court to hold that the words 'advocate and solicitor' in section 13(1) of the Act includes an advocate called to the Sarawak Bar under the Advocates Ordinance of Sarawak because such interpretation would facilitate the intention of the legislature to treat Sabah, Sarawak and West Malaysia as one country for the purpose of pupillage."

The learned Judge also relied on another passage in the judgment of Suffian L.P. and concluded by saying that in this particular case it was possible and proper to construe the Act purposively.

In our view the learned Judge failed to appreciate the ratio decidendi in Samantha Murthi case (ante) nor did he distinguish the facts of that case with the present one. In that case the petitioner had read in Chambers in Kuching in the office of Mr. Reddy. Although the petitioner's master Mr. Reddy had been admitted