Suffian LP (delivering the judgement of the Court):

The issue here is whether an appeal lies from the decision of a High Court Judge dismissing the application of a person under s. 66 of the Courts of Judicature Act, 1964, to reserve for the decision of the Federal Court a question of law of public interest which has arisen in the course of an appeal by that person.

The applicant, a Clerk in the Education Department in Seremban, was charged with CBT contrary to s. 409 of the Penal Code and the learned President acquitted him. On appeal by the Public Prosecutor, the learned High Court Judge found him guilty, and convicted and sentenced him to one year's imprisonment.

The applicant applied to the learned Judge for certain questions of law of public interest to be referred to this Court under s. 66 of the Courts of Judicature Act, 1964, which application the learned Judge dismissed.

Whereupon the applicant applied to us for special leave to appeal from the decision of the learned Judge.

In answer to the objection we raised whether we had jurisdiction to entertain this application, Mr. Ramachandran argued that we had because, he said, of two grounds:

(1)under the new art. 125A(1)(a) of the constitution added by Act A354 of 1976, which reads:

125A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, it is hereby declared that -

(a) the Lord President of the Federal Court and a Judge of the Federal Court may exercise all or any of the powers of a Judge of a High Court.

the Lord President and a Judge of the Federal Court have the same power as a Judge of the High Court, so this Court has power to revise the decision of the High Court in the same way as the High Court has power to revise a decision of a Subordinate Court; and

(2)the abolition of criminal appeals to the Privy Council results in equating this Court with the Privy Council and has not abolished the subject's right to appeal to his sovereign.

As regards ground (1), in our judgment the new art. 125A(1)(a) refers to the power of the Lord President or a Judge of the Federal Court when sitting individually in the High Court, and not to their power when sitting collectively in the Federal Court. Thus the Lord President or a Federal Judge may sit to try cases in the High Court in the same way as a Judge of the High Court. That article alone does not intend to confer on the Federal Court all the powers of the High Court.

As regards ground (2), Mr. Ramachandran cited Arnold v. The King Emperor [1914] AC 644 and Lanier v. Rex [1914] AC 221. In the first case occurs at page 646 this passage from the judgment of Lord Kingdown in the case of Falkland Island Co. v. Reg. 1 Moo PC (NS) 299 cited with approval by Lord Shaw of Dumferline:

It may be assumed that the Queen has authority by virtue of her prerogative to review the decision of all colonial Courts, whether the proceedings be of a civil or criminal character, unless Her Majesty has parted with such authority.

Sir John Beaumont stated the principle that governs appeals to the Privy Council in King-Emperor v. Vimlabai Deshpande 73 IA 144 as follows:

The broad principle ... is that appeals from decisions of Courts in the British Dominions and dependencies to the King in Council are heard under the royal prerogative, and that the prerogative can only be curtailed by force of an Act of Parliament, that is, by the King in Parliament. (p. 152).

Mr. Ramachandran mentioned as an example Mary Ng v. Reg [1958] MLJ 108 a Singapore case, where the accused after losing her appeal to the High Court from conviction by a District Court, appealed straight to the Privy Council without going through the Singapore Court of Appeal. Mr. Ramachandran tried to persuade us that similarly as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong's Judges, we have power to entertain this application.

In our judgment, the principle stated by Lord Shaw and Sir John Beaumont applies only to the British sovereign's authority over her dependences overseas ,