Hashim Yeop A Sani J:

From the pleadings the following background facts do not seem to be seriously in dispute. By a trust deed made on 18 May 1973 between the first defendant of the one part and the second and third defendants of the other part the parties declared that the land held under State LeaseNo. 165, Lot 46222 in the Mukim of Ulu Kinta comprising an area of 145,490 square feet were held by them in trust for the sole use and exclusive benefit of the Wan Hwa National Type Primary School (Chinese) otherwise known as the Sekolah Rendah Jenis Kebangsaan (China). On 30 May 1973 they were registered as trustees of the said school land. Sometime before 4 June 1974 the first, second and third defendants purported to transfer the said school land to the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh defendants and the purported transfer was registered on 4 June 1974. It is also not seriously disputed that the said school is the national type primary school within the meaning of the Education Act 1961 and that besides the government the school also has a number of "supporters" (of whom plaintiff is one) who make donations to the school from time to time.

In dispute are whether the purported transfer of the school land was in breach of the trust and that the resolution of the Board of Management purporting to authorise the transfer was valid or that the transfer was otherwise made in fraud of the school and its supporters and subscribers. In the action the plaintiff seeks to ask for a declaration that the purported transfer was null and void and of no effect and damages against the first three defendants.

On 6 November 1974 an application was made on behalf of the first three defendants to set aside the writ commencing the action on the ground that the plaintiff is not a proper party to the suit and/or that the provisions of s. 9 of the Government Proceedings Ordinance 1956 have not been complied with. On 10 February 1975 I gave order in terms in chambers and on 2 June 1975 the application was adjourned to open court for further argument under 0.54 r. 22A of the Rules of the Supreme Court.

From the bare facts disclosed on the pleadings I am satisfied that the land in question was held in express trust for the sole use and exclusive benefit of a school. It is prima facie a public or charitable trust, by public is meant for the benefit either of the public at large or some considerable portion of it answering a particular description.

Section 9(1) of the Government Proceedings Ordinance 1956 says that in the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust for public, religious social or charitable purposes, or where the direction of the court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Attorney General or two or more persons having interest in the trust and having obtained consent in writing of the Attorney General may institute a suit or be joined as a party in any existing suit on behalf of the government or the public for the purpose of obtaining reliefs specified in the subsection. Paragraph (i) of this subsection would certainly include the sort of relief asked for by the plaintiff in this case. Subsection (2) of s. 9 of that Ordinance gives the following direction:-

9 (2) No suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in sub-section (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with the provisions of that subsection.

The arguments advanced on behalf of the first three defendants are straightforward. They are that the plaintiff cannot take action without the Attorney General on the face of s. 9(1) and (2) of the Ordinance, the trust being charitable trust in law and the land being held for the exclusive benefit of a school citing Lee Eng Teh & Ors. V. Teh Thiang Seong & Anor. money being the subject of the trust in that case and land in the instant case.

In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 4, at page 440, para 914 states:

914 Attorne