At the conclusion of the hearing of two Magistrates Appeals last Friday, which were heard together as they were both concerned with the ambit of section 183 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 113), I allowed both appeals, varied the orders of two learned District Judges and directed that the discharges in both the appeals amounted to acquittals. In addition to discharging my duty to do so, I am setting out my grounds in deference to since I found myself at variance with the written grounds of decisions of both the learned District Judges who have had much experience in the administration of criminal justice in the Subordinate Courts.

The two appeals arose in this way. In Magistrates Appeal No. 78 of 1984, Arnold Ah Chak, a detective sergeant of the Singapore Police Force, faced two charges that he on two different days in June, 1983 did corruptly obtain for himself from two prostitutes gratifications in the form of sexual intercourse as inducements to return them their passports and not putting them on the blacklist for immigration purposes. He was alleged to have committed offences under section 6(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap. 104). When the case was called on for hearing on March 26, 1984, the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor applied for the accused to be discharged not amounting to an acquittal in respect of the two charges as the prosecution could not go on due to the fact that the two prostitutes, as principal witnesses for the prosecution, were not available.

Learned counsel for the accused applied to the learned District Judge to direct a discharge amounting to an acquittal under section 183(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code but the latter declined to do so. Instead, he ordered that the accused be discharged not amounting to an acquittal on the two charges. His sole and only ground may be summarised in this way. The prosecution in the case was unable to proceed because of the unavailability of the two witnesses. Since it was not withdrawing the charges, the prosecution had not informed the court that "(it) will not further prosecute the (accused) upon the charge(s)" within the meaning of that phrase (as substituted) in subsection 183(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. He accordingly held that "there was nothing (in the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code) which could empower me to discharge the accused amounting to an acquittal." With the greatest of respect to the learned District Judge, I am of the view that he has misconstrued the meaning of the phrase in sub-section 183(1) of the Code which I have quoted. I must now recite section 183 of the Code which is in the following terms:-

"183(1) At any stage of any summary trial before judgment has been

delivered, the Public Prosecutor may, if he thinks fit, inform

the court that he will not further prosecute the

defendant upon the charge and thereupon all proceedings on the

charge against the Defendant shall be stayed and he shall be

discharged from and of the same.

(2) Such discharge shall not amount to an acquittal unless the court

so directs except in cases coming under section 176.

What then must the Public Prosecutor inform the court before the consequences of a stay of the proceedings and a discharge of a defendant can arise and take place? In other words, what is the meaning of the phrase "he (the Public Prosecutor) will not further prosecute the defendant upon the charge?" To my mind, there are two possible meanings. The first is the Public Prosecutor informing the court that for some reason, such as the unavailability of a prosecution witness, he will not at the stage when the case has come on for hearing go on with the prosecution of the defendant upon the charge. In other words, he informs the court that he has decided that he will not take the prosecution beyond what has gone on up to that stage. The other meaning is the Pu