In June 1985 the judgment creditor commenced an action against the judgment debtor for the sum of $14,102.88 and interest being the sum due from the judgment debtor's MasterCard and Visa Card issued to the judgment debtor by the judgment creditor. Judgment in default of appearance was entered against the judgment debtor for the sum claimed and interest and costs on July 29, 1985.

The judgment debtor is employed as a Senior Telecoms Operator-In-Charge with the Telecommunication Authority of Singapore (the garnishee).

The judgment creditor applied ex parte by summons for and obtained on September 6, 1985, a Garnishee Order To Show Cause calling upon the garnishee to show cause and the garnishee was required to attend before the Assistant Registrar on Friday, September 27, 1985. However, the hearing was not till October 4, 1985, when only the judgment creditor appeared, whereupon the Assistant Registrar made a Garnishee Order Absolute against the garnishee ordering the garnishee to pay forthwith to the judgment creditor the sum of $967.70, being the judgment debtor's net salary for the month of October 1985, and costs.

The judgment debtor now appeals against the decisions of the Assistant Registrar given on September 6, 1985, and October 4, 1985.

Counsel for the judgment creditor says that it is doubtful that the judgment debtor can come forward to dispute the debt when the garnishee is not disputing. He argues that a garnishee proceeding is between a judgment creditor and the garnishee only. As he puts it, "the main fight is between the garnishee and the judgment creditor".

I am of the view that the judgment debtor has a right to apply to the Court to set aside the Garnishee Order To Show Cause and the Garnishee Order Absolute.

Order 49 rule 3(1) provides that the order to show cause must, at least seven days before the time appointed thereby for the further consideration of the matter, be served not only on the garnishee but also on the jugment debtor unless the Court otherwise directs. It seems to me that a judgment debtor can attend before the Court to state his objection to the garnishee order nisi being made absolute. In this case the Garnishee Order To Show Cause was not served on the judgment debtor.

In any case the Court can hear the judgment debtor's application under its inherent powers and make any order as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court (Order 92 Rule 4).

Counsel for the judgment debtor submits that a salary or other periodic payment of a similar nature is only attachable when it becomes a debt but not before and cites as his authorities paragraph 531 of Vol. 17 Halsbury's Laws of England 4th edn. at page 330 and the cases of Jones v Thompson (1858) E1 B1 & E1 63; 120 ER 430, Hall v Pritchett (1877) 3 QBD 215 and Mapleson v Sears (1911) 105 LT 639.

The headnotes of Hall v. Pritchett reads:

"The salary of a medical or other officer cannot, before it is actually payable, be attached by a garnishee order under the County Court Rules, 1875, for it is not 'a debt, owing or accruing' to the judgment debtor.

Jones v. Thompson followed."

Counsel for the judgment creditor seeks to distinguish the cases cited by the counsel for the judgment debtor stating that those cases are all cases of Writ of Seizure and Sale and not applicable to garnishee proceedings.

In my view the submission of counsel for the judgment debtor is correct.

There is no dispute that the judgment debtor's October salary was not due until October 31, 1985. So at the date of the Garnishee Order Absolute, October 4, 1985, there was no attachable debt. Even an existing right under which something is accrued which will probably become a debt at some future date is not sufficient notwithstanding that the amount to become due is capable of being calculated with precision (17 Halsbury's paragraph 527).

Counsel for the judgment creditor argues that the relevant date is the service of the Garnishee Orde