Abdul Hamid Mohamad JCA:

The appellant was the plaintiff in the High Court. He filed a suit against the respondents seeking a declaration, in brief, that his dismissal as a police officer was null and void, and consequential orders. The High Court dismissed his action. He appealed to this court. We dismissed the appeal. Here are our grounds.

The appellant joined the Police Force in 1960. He rose to the rank Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP). He held this rank until his dismissal.

On 30 September 1994, a show cause letter with a view to disciplinary action against him was forwarded to him. On 17 November 1994 the appellant made a written representation to the first respondent. By a letter dated 9 August 1996, the appellant was informed that he was dismissed from the force with effect form 29 June 1996. At the time when he received the letter of dismissal, he had passed his mandatory retirement age which fell on 7 July 1996 but his services were extended until the day the decision to dismiss him was made.

Two grounds were argued before us. The first ground was the delay of one year and eight months for the first respondent to make its decision to dismiss the appellant. The second ground was that the appellant was not informed on which of the three charges he was dismissed.

This is one appeal in which we agree entirely with the decision and the reasons thereto of the learned judge that we do not think it is necessary to repeat the same reasons at length.

The relevant provision is the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993, in so far as it is relevant to the facts of this case, provides:

If ... the officer furnishes a representation which does not exculpate himself to the satisfaction of the appropriate Disciplinary Authority, the Disciplinary Authority shall then proceed to consider and decide the dismissal ... of the officer.

No time limit is provided for the decision to be made.

Section 54(2) of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967inter alia, provides:

Where no time is prescribed within which anything shall be done, that thing shall be done with all convenient speed ... .

As correctly pointed out by the learned judge, quoting Bhagwal J in SK Serajah v. State of West BengalAIR [1975] SC 1517:

Each case must depend on its own peculiar facts and circumstances.

Our own Supreme Court, in Tai Choi Yu v. Government of Malaysia[1994] 2 CLJ 174, has held:

What is 'convenient speed' has been held by the courts to mean reasonable time within which an act has to be done, but always having regard to the facts and peculiar circumstances of each case.

We accept that that is the law.

The facts and circumstances of this case were discussed at length by the learned judge. He considered them under two heads, first, the constitution of the members of the Commission and secondly, the administrative machinery of the Commission.

Regarding the constitution of the Commission, as pointed out by the learned judge, it consists of nine members, headed by the Prime Minister of Malaysia in his then capacity as Minister of Home Affairs. The other members were the Inspector General of Police, the President of the Court of Appeal and six other notable personalities. DW1, the Assistant Secretary of the Commission explained the procedures of the decision making process: The relevant documents were forwarded to the members of the Commission who had to study them and return them to the Commission Secretariat with their views. The views subsequently received from the members were "processed" and the decision would then be forwarded to the Chairman of the Commission.

The learned judge considered the extremely heavy duties of the members and the fact that the Commission's Secretariat was handling a great number of disciplinary cases and concluded that the Commission had discharged its duties within a reasonable time or, in the words of s. 54 of the Interpretation Acts"with all convenient speed".

We agree with him.

On the second grou