Lim Beng Choon J:

[1] The defendant, Lian Seng Properties Sdn Bhd ('LSP'), in Civil Suit No: 22(23)39-87 ('CS 39/87') filed a notice of appeal to the Judge-in-chambers (Encl 37) against the decision of the Senior Assistant Registrar ('the SAR') given on 13 September 1990 dismissing LSP's application made by way of summons-inchambers (Encl 19) in which they prayed for an order that the judgment in default of defence entered against them on 31 March 1987 by the plaintiff, Pembinaan KSY Sdn Bhd ('KSY'), be set aside and also another order that all execution proceedings pursuant to the said judgment in default be stayed pending the trial and final disposal of the action.

[2] Again, LSP in Civil Suit No:22-192-1988 ('CS 192/88'), where they were cited as the first defendant, filed a notice of appeal to the Judge-in-chambers (Encl 41) against the decision of the SAR given on 17 November 1988 in favour of KSY's application (Encl 11) and granting leave to KSY to enter final judgment pursuant to O 14 of the Rules of High 1980 against LSP.

[3] Counsel acting for the respective parties agreed that both the appeals be heard together and I heard both the appeals on 10 April 1992.

Appeal in CS 39/87

[4] In respect of the appeal in CS 39/87, Counsel for LSP relied on two grounds to support the appeal, namely:

(1) The judgment in default entered by KSY against LSP on 31 March 1987 is a nullity in that as KSY had given an extension of seven days from 23 March 1987 to enable LSP to file their statement of defence which they did so within the extended time, KSY had no right to enter judgment in default on 31 March 1987. That being the case, the said default judgment should be set aside ex debito justitiae.

(2) There had been an accord and satisfaction in respect of the claims in CS 39/87 when KSY executed an agreement on 22 April 1987 with LSP (which is referred to by the parties and also in this judgment as 'the lump sum agreement') by which the parties had agreed to enter into a compromise to settle all disputes pursuant to the terms and conditions of the lump sum agreement. In the result, the right of KSY arising from the said default judgment has merged into the lump sum agreement. That being the case KSY can only exercise their said right subject to the terms and conditions of the lump sum agreement. This same ground was also relied upon by Counsel for LSP to set aside the O 14 judgment obtained by KSY on 17 November 1988.

[5] In support of the aforementioned ground (1), Counsel for LSP drew my attention to the affidavit affirmed by one Ng Yoke Mui ('Cik Ng') the legal adviser to LSP, affirmed on 22 April 1987 (Encl 8). The averments in that affidavit generally speak of the negotiations that were going on at the material time and the reason why the defence was not filed earlier. In particular, Counsel pointed out to me para 8 of the affidavit in which it was averred:

[6] Even after this present suit was filed by the plaintiff the negotiations continued and the plaintiff and/or through their solicitors did on numerous occasions enlarge the time required for the filing of the defendant's defence.

[7] Cik Ng then produced several letters marked as Exh NYM1(a) to (e) annexed to the affidavit to show that KSY had consented to extend the time for LSP to file their statement of defence. It is appropriate to examine the relevant part of each of those letters in order to find out whether ground (1) of Counsel can be sustained. The first letter (Exh NYM1(a)) produced is a letter written by the previous solicitors of KSY dated 13 February 1987 in which it was stated:

Kindly be informed that pursuant to your clients' request we hereby grant your goodselves until 28 February 1987 to file and serve the defence to the above suit.

[Emphasis Added]

[8] The second letter (Exh NYM1(b)) is another letter written by the previous solicitors of KSY dated 17 February 1987 in which it was stated:

Further to our letter dated 13 February 1987 this is to confirm that all p