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1997 MarsdenLR 1451

HIGH COURT MALAYA IPOH
SEEMA DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD – Appellant
Versus
MAH KIM CHYE & ANOR – Respondent
[Civil Suit No: 23-404-86 & 23-405-86]



JUDGMENT

Abdul Hamid Embong J:

Two similar inter partes applications viz encl 65 in GS. 404-86 and encl 49 in GS. 405-86, were made by the plaintiff seeking for a post judgment Mareva injunction couched in the following words:-

The defendant whether by himself, his servants or agents or otherwise be restrained from applying to the High Court for the payment out of the sum of RM144,202.72 standing to the credit of the defendant in Court being compensation for the compulsory acquisition of 0.99515 hectre of the land held under H.S.(D) L.P. No 572/79 for lot P.T. 1965 in the Mukim of Durien Sebatang in the District of Hilir Perak awarded by the Collector of Land Revenue for Hilir Perak and deposited in the High Court by the said Collector pursuant to an Order made in Ipoh High Court Originating Summons No 21- 48-89 and from receiving payment from the Accountant General Malaysia before the full settlement of the judgment dated 17 October 1996 obtained by the plaintiff in this suit.

On 17 October 1996 this Court had, after a full trial of both civil suits, allowed the plaintiff's claim for a refund of the money it had paid to the defendant under a sale and purchase agreement of the defendant's land held under H.S.(D) L.P. 572/79, PT. 1965 Mukim Durien Sebatang (the subject land) after that agreement fell through. Part of the subject land had earlier been acquired by the government and a sum of RM144,202.72 as compensation had been deposited in Court under s 29(2) of the Land Acquisition Act 1960. The deposited money is now the target of the injunction sought by the plaintiff in these applications, which were jointly heard.

The applications are supported by the affidavits of Kuan Peng Hang @ Kwan Peng Hong, the managing director of the plaintiff. In those affidavits it was affirmed that the defendant is now residing in Australia, that he had no other assets save for subject land, and that the plaintiff believed that the defendant is avoiding execution, and further to allow the defendant to withdraw the money deposited in Court would jeopardize the plaintiff's position because the former might dissipate or remove the asset out of jurisdiction.

Learned counsel for the plaintiff had submitted that the subject land itself would not be sufficient to satisfy the judgment debt, now standing at RM330,783.99. He also contended that there had been no attempt by the defendant to satisfy the judgment debt or any part of it and that his continued delay to do so was an indication of avoidance. These applications he argued, are within this Court jurisdiction and would aid the execution of the judgment.

Learned counsel for the defendant while admitting that the grant of an injunction was entirely within this Court's discretion, submitted that, on the dissipation point, the plaintiff must show that there was a real risk of the assets being taken out of jurisdiction. He contended that merely showing that the defendant resided abroad was no ground for allowing these applications He further submitted that the plaintiff had not given any undertaking in damages, a condition precedent to the granting of an injunction. Counsel also questioned this Court's jurisdiction to grant an injunction citing s 54(b) Specific Relief Act 1950 (SRA), as a bar He argued that the acquisition proceeding is still in progress by way of an objection before another High Court and as such to grant this injunction would have the effect of staying the proceedings before that Court and this contravenes the said s 54(b) SRA.

1

Order 29, rule 1(1) of the Rules of the High provides that an application for grant of an injunction may be made before or after the trial of a cause or matter That this Court is seised with the power to now grant this injunction is well illustrated in Orwell Steel (Erection and Fabrication) Ltd v. Asphalt and Tarmac (UK) Ltd[1984] 1 WLR 1097 where it was held that the Court had the power to grant an interlocutory injunction between final judgment and execution. Farq

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