(delivering the Judgment of the Court): This was an appeal against the award of costs by Harun J. in Originating Summons No. A254 of 1984. We dismissed the appeal with costs and we now give our reasons.

The events leading to this appeal may be summarised as follows. On December 8, 1984 the respondent took out an Originating Summons No. A254 of 1984 against both the appellants as defendants. In the Originating Summons a number of declarations were sought for, the main ones being —

(1) a declaration that the acquisition of shares in Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad by Petronas is ultra vires the Petroleum Development Act, 1974;

(2) a declaration that the purchase or acquisition of $2.488 billion "problem loans" of Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad by Petronas is ultra vires the Petroleum Development Act, 1974.

The backdrop of the Originating Summons is an episode in the banking history of this country popularly described as the "BMF scandal". In order to rescue the Bank concerned from getting into a crisis due to bad loans the Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS in short) acquired a majority share holding in the Bank. The respondent, exercising what he considered as his right as an account holder in the Bank as well as a citizen of this country, took out the Originating Summons to challenge the legality of the acquisition of the shares of the Bank by PETRONAS. Soon after the Originating Summons was served on the appellants both the appellants took out summons-in-chambers on December 29, 1984 to strike out the Originating Summons. The grounds relied on by both appellants were substantially identical namely that the Originating Summons and supporting affidavit disclosed no reasonable cause of action against either of them and that the action was misconceived, frivolous and vexatious as well as an abuse of the process of the court.

For all intents and purposes PETRONAS is a government corporation established under the Petroleum Development Act, 1974 and the Companies Act 1965. Some time pending the hearing of the summons-in-chambers to strike out the Originating Summons the second appellant tabled a Bill in Parliament and the Bill was subsequently passed by Parliament as the Petroleum Development (Amendment) Act, 1985. The amending Act of 1985 gave new powers to the corporation and these now powers are described in the new section 3A of the Act as the "power to take over or acquire by agreement, assignment, purchase or by any other means the whole or any part of any commercial undertaking, business or enterprise of whatever form of any person or body of persons (corporate or unincorporate)." Section 4(1) of the amending Act then declares that:

"Every act done or transaction carried out by PETRONAS before the enactment of this Act that would have been lawful if this Act had been enacted and in force when such act was done or transaction was carried out is hereby declared to be and always to have been lawfully done or carried out by PETRONAS, and such act or transaction may be continued and dealt with under the principal Act as amended by this Act."

The amending Act 1985 was made retrospective to have effect from October 1, 1974 i.e. from the date when the parent Act first came into force.

So when the summons-in-chambers to strike out the Originating Summons came to be heard on July 22, 1985 the respondent could no longer dispute that he had no cause of action and the whole proceeding before the learned Judge dwelt only on the question of costs.

In our law the discretion of the court in matter of costs is clearly spelt out. In the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 section 68(1)(c) puts in no uncertain terms that no appeal should be brought to the Supreme Court where the judgment or order relates to costs only, "which by law are left to the discretion of the Court," except with the leave of the Supreme Court or the Judge concerned. Order 59 rule 3(2) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 provides as follows:

"If the Court