2009 MarsdenLR 3025
HIGH COURT, KOTA KINABALU
DEVELOPMENT & COMMERCIAL BANK BHD & ORS – Appellant
Versus
LOKE THEEN FATT – Respondent
[Bankruptcy No: 455-1992-I]
JUDGMENT
David Wong Dak Wah J:
Proceeding
[1] This is an appeal against the decision of the deputy registrar on 17 March 2006 which allowed the application of the respondent for a discharge as a bankrupt subject to a consent judgment entered against the respondent for the balance of the respondent's debt as at the date of discharge. The application was made pursuant to s. 33 of the Bankruptcy Act 1967 and r. 194 of the Bankruptcy Rules 1969 . The respondent was adjudicated a bankrupt on 1 October 1993.
Contentions Of The Appellants
[2] The grounds relied on by appellants are these:
i. The respondent had only paid a sum of RM202,442.27 which is merely 2% of the outstanding debt which is around RM16,337,788.33.
ii. The respondent had failed to file his statement of account within the statutory period of 14 days.
iii. The respondent had failed to submit book of account detailing his finances and expenditures over a period of three years.
iv. The respondent had continued to trade despite being bankrupt.
v. The DGI report is flawed.
Ground 1
[3] The answer to this contention can be found in the case of Re Siah Ooi Choe; ex p Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation [1988] SLR 903, where the court held on this point, inter alia , as follows:
... with reference to the size of the debt, the court agreed that it was a very big one, but there was no upper limit set out by the Act beyond which discharge was barred. The huge amount of debt here merely reflected that fact that a big business when it failed, tended to fail in a big way and it was in recognition of this fact that no maximum amount was stipulated in the Act ...
[4] This principle of law has been adopted in this country; hence I find that this contention is without merit.
Ground 2
[5] The contention here is that since the bankrupt had committed an offence in failing to file his statement of affairs within the statutory period, the deputy registrar under s. 33(4) of the Act can only grant a discharge only if 50% dividends of the debt had been paid. In the case of Re Joshua Tan Pin Pin, ex p William Jacks & Co (M) Sdn Bhd, [2007] 4 MLJ 534 , the court held that the word 'committed' in s. 33(4) of the Act means that the bankrupt must have been charged in court by the Director General of Insolvency (DGI) for that offence. I see no reason to differ from that view and since the respondent had not been cited for contempt of court by the DGI, I find that the respondent had not committed any offence of the Act as specified in s. 33(4) of the Act . It follows then the application for the respondent's discharge must be dealt with pursuant s. 33(3) of the Act which states as follows:
(3) On the hearing of the application the court shall take into consideration a report of the Director General of Insolvency as to the bankrupt's conduct and affairs, including a report as to the bankrupt's conduct during the proceedings under his bankruptcy, and may either grant or refuse an absolute order of discharge, or suspend the operation of the order for a specified time, or grant an order of discharge subject to any conditions with respect to any earnings or income which may afterwards become due to the bankrupt, or with respect to his after-acquired property.
[6] This section provides the court some guidelines as to how to exercise its discretion whether or not to grant an order of discharge. These guidelines require the court to look at the totality of the evidence or circumstance of the bankrupt and then ask itself the question whether it is fair or just to grant a discharge. The starting point must be the DGI's report which in law must be taken as prima facie evidence of the respondent's conduct but it can be challenged by the creditors as stated by Ian Chin J in Re Lau Kah Lay & Tang Kuong Tiew; ex p Cold Storage (Malaysia) Bhd, [2001] 6 MLJ 311 :
The OA carries the onerous task of ensuring that a bankrupt has no hidden assets stashed away whether in his name or in the name of his wife or children as otherwis