The court clarified that a granted leave to appeal does not obligate the court to answer the posed question, emphasizing the absence of injustice under Rule 137.

Gopal Sri Ram FCJ:

[1] This is an application said to be made under r. 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court to review and set aside an earlier decision made in this very case. The relevant facts are as follows. The applicant (appellant in the substantive appeal) failed in the litigation it had with the respondent at two levels - before the High Court and the Court of Appeal. It then applied and, on 17 September 2008, obtained leave to appeal to this Court on the following question:

Whether when in interpreting a general release and/or a clause in the agreement containing a general release, it is ever permissible in law to take a literal rather than contextual interpretation of the same by ignoring the surrounding circumstances or factual background known to the parties at or before the date of the release.

[2] On 17 December 2008, the respondent took out a motion to set aside the leave granted and in the alternative for leave to adduce further evidence. It appears from the record of this court that the appeal and the motion both came on for hearing on 10 March 2009 before a differently constituted panel. At that stage, the respondent amended his motion for the main prayer to read as follows:

that this Court ought not to answer the question posed on 17.9.2008.

According to the evidence filed before us, the amendment was unopposed and the motion was argued. At the conclusion of arguments, the court dismissed the appeal and made the usual consequential orders. The appellant's case based on these undisputed facts is that it is entitled to have the order of 10 March 2009 set aside and to have the appeal reinstated for hearing.

[3] Now, I must confess that when I first read the cause papers I formed the view that the appellant was right in its contention. However, having re-read the papers and the relevant authorities, I am now satisfied beyond a doubt that the initial view I formed was wrong and that this application must be dismissed. My reasons are as follows.

[4] It is now settled that the grant of leave upon a question does not impose a duty on this court to answer it. Put differently, there is no legitimate expectation in an appellant by the mere grant of leave that the question posed will be answered. There are several cases that make this plain. But I find it sufficient to quote merely from one of them.

[5] In Sri Kelangkota-Rakan Engineering JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Arab-Malaysian Prima Realty Sdn Bhd & Ors , Abdul Malek Ahmad FCJ put the point in plain terms:

The common feature in the Capital Berhad's case (supra) (Capital Insurance Bhd v. Asiah Abdul Manap & Anor ), the Raphael Pura case (supra) (Raphael Pura v. Insas Bhd & Anor ) and The Minister for Human Resources' case (supra) (The Minister for Human Resources v. Thong Chin Yoong & Another Appeal ) is that the merits had not been dealt with in the Court of Appeal. Further, after leave had been granted on those cases, a preliminary objection had been raised at the appeal stage to establish the point that leave should not have been given. All three appeals had been dismissed with costs without going into the merits when this court upheld the preliminary objections. The situation is somewhat different here as both the High Court and the Court of Appeal had actually dealt with the matter on the merits. It was not simply a matter of a lack of jurisdiction. Further, no preliminary objection had been raised at the appeal stage before us against the granting of the leave.

Despite that, in the light of the authorities, we would hold that we are not prevented from reconsidering the issue of leave again. Coming back to the questions formulated for determination by this