Shaik Daud Ismail JCA:

This is an appeal from the decision of the High Court which had, on 1 November 1996, dismissed an originating summons filed by the appellant.

The facts leading to this dismissal were that the appellant was a registered director engineer practising under the name of Sigoh Din Sdn. Bhd., a body corporate of Consulting engineers approved to practise as such under s. 7A of the Registration of Engineers Act 1967 (the said Act) by virtue of which the appellant was a registered engineer. The Ministry of Defence had awarded a contract to Sigoh Sdn. Bhd. to construct and complete an ammunition depot in Melaka. Due to some complaints lodged by the Ministry of Defence, the respondent, the Board of Engineers established under s. 3 of the said Act, commenced disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. He was charged under r. 25 of Part IV (Code of Professional Conduct) of the Registration of Engineers Rules 1972 which were made under s. 26 of the said Act.

Before the disciplinary proceedings could commence, the appellant applied to the court by originating summons seeking a declaration that the alleged contravention of the Registration of Engineers Rule 1972, based on circumstances and facts that took place prior to January 1987, would not enable the disciplinary action to be taken against the appellant under s. 15 of the said Act. In addition the appellant also sought a prohibitory injunction to prevent the respondent from investigating against the appellant.

The records also showed that earlier the appellant applied for an interim injunction preventing the respondent from investigating against him until the completion of the proceedings. Another High Court granted the injunction ex parte but on an application by the respondent, the ex parte interim injunction was set aside.

The appeal before us is in fact on the question of jurisdiction of the respondent under, and their powers under s. 15 of the said Act.

Now, it is common ground that the alleged misconduct of the appellant to be enquired into by the respondent occurred before 16 January 1987, the date of coming into force of the Registration of Engineers (Amendment) Act 1987 (Act A 662) which amended the said Act. It is also common ground that the charge against the appellant to be enquired into by the respondent is under s. 15(1) of the said Act prior to its amendment, which reads:

S. 15(1). Subject to this section the Board may order the cancellation of the registration of any Engineer under any of the following circumstances:

(a)-(f) - not applicable;

(g) if he is found by the Board to have contravened the Act.

(h) not applicable.

Section 15(1) is to be found in Part IV of the said Act and it was amended by Act 662:

(g) if he is found by the Board to have contravened, or failed to comply with, this Act or any regulations made thereunder.

It was the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant in the High Court as well as before us that since the alleged act of the appellant for which he was charged before the respondent, was in respect of the provisions prior to amendment of the said Act, he could only be charged for offences under the said Act and not under any regulations which only came into effect by the amendment. As mentioned earlier the appellant's challenge is on the jurisdiction of the respondent.

Learned counsel for the respondent argued that there is a distinction between the jurisdiction of the respondent and the evidence upon which the charge is to be based. He further contended that so far as the jurisdiction issue is concerned, there is a policy issue at stake. While he conceded that the courts have the powers to intervene, he questions whether the court should intervene at this stage of the proceedings on the issue of jurisdiction.

We agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that although the courts have the power to intervene, in the circumstances of this case, we should not interven