Raus Sharif JCA:

[1] The appellants are stallholders of Fuji Market ("the market"). The market stands on two pieces of land situated at Jalan Sin Onn, Tawau, owned by Hongkong & Canton Food Industries Sdn Bhd. The land owner built the market after obtaining an approval from Tawau Municipal Council ("the respondent"). The market started its operation in 1992.

[2] Subsequently, the land in which the market was situated was transferred to ATS Land Sdn Bhd ("ATS"). Hence, ATS became the operator of the market. As the operator, ATS, like the previous land owner, had to pay the respondent certain sum of money representing the fees payable for the license of operating the stalls. ATS in turn, collected from the stallholders RM30 per month per stall.

[3] By letters dated 30 April 2001, 6 July 2001 and 16 July 2001 to ATS, the respondent indicated its decision to terminate the operation of the Market. The stallholders appealed to the respondent to reconsider its decision vide their letter dated 28 May 2001. However, in a letter dated 19 October 2001 issued to the stallholders, including the appellants, the respondent requested them to move out. Hence, this application by the appellants.

[4] The applicants sought for several reliefs. Basically they were seeking for an order of certiorari to quash the decision by the respondent contained in its letters dated 30 April 2001, 6 July 2001 and 16 July 2001 to ATS, to terminate or revoke the approval granted to ATS to operate or manage the market. In effect, they wanted ATS to continue operating the market.

[5] The learned High Court Judge dismissed the appellants' application with costs. Before us, a number of grounds were raised. But the real issue is whether there was a failure of the respondent to adhere to the principle of natural justice and fairness in making its decision to terminate the Market. The instances of such failure were the absence of reasons for the termination and not giving the appellants any real opportunity to make representation before the termination was made.

[6] The learned High Court Judge dealt with the issue in the following manner:

As regards the arguments that there was no reason given for the decision to terminate the Market and that the applicants were not given any or adequate opportunity to make representation before the termination was made, I think such contentions were misconceived. There was no denial that the Market affair was between the respondent and ATS. The letters of approval (LPC-6, LPC-11 and LPC-12 of Enclosure 3) and subsequently the termination (LPC-7 of Enclosure 3) were addressed to ATS. It was ATS that was expected to make the payment for the stall - license fees. Receipts for the payment of such fees were in the name of ATS. Yet ATS was not before the Court as an applicant for such order as prayed for by the applicants in this case. And although the applicants asserted that they were in fact the parties that paid for the fees through ATS that could not be said to have earned them the same position as ATS. As between the applicants and ATS their relationship at best would be contractual in which the respondent was not a party.

[7] I am in complete agreement with the reasoning of the learned High Court Judge. As rightly pointed out by the learned High Court Judge, the affairs of the Market was between ATS and the respondent. The letters of approval and subsequently the termination of the market were addressed to ATS. Thus, any complaint that the respondent did not adhere to the principle of natural justice in making its decision to terminate the operations of the market rightly should come from ATS, not the appellants. But ATS did not complain. ATS did not even file any affidavit in support of the allegations as alleged by the appellants. Presumably, it had accepted the decision of the respondent to terminate the market.

[8] Furthermore, the facts of this case clearly revealed that the appellants had no contractual relationship with the resp