Hj Abdul Malik Hj Ishak J:

Timber concessions were granted to the first defendant in an area known as Dalam Air Tasik Temenggor, Daerah Hulu Perak ("the designated area") and being impecunious the first defendant entered into an agreement with the plaintiff on 19 February 1994 wherein the latter agreed to buy all the timber logs extracted from the designated area. Under the agreement, the plaintiff advanced RM432,000 to the first defendant to enable the latter to commence extraction of the timber logs at the designated area. The money advanced by the plaintiff came from Rencovest Sdn Bhd of which the plaintiff was the Managing Director and the majority shareholder. On the sly, the cunning first defendant entered into another agreement dated 8 August 1994 with the second defendant for the sale of all the timber logs extracted from the designated area. As a matter of urgency and feeling threatened, the plaintiff applied for an ex-parteinterim injunction. This was perfectly a legitimate course of action as Megarry J. saidBates v. Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone[1972] 3 ALL ER 1019t "Ex-parteinjunctions are for cases of real urgency, where there has been a true impossibility of giving notice of motion." In due course, on 8 September 1994, I granted an ex-parteinterim injunction restraining both the defendants from removing timber logs extracted from the designated area and at the instance of the plaintiff's Counsel, the return date was accordingly fixed on 21 September 1994.

O 29 r (2B) of the Rules of the High , 1980 ("RHC") which came into effect on 2 November 1993 videP U(A) 364/93 states as follows:

Unless sooner revoked or set aside, an interim injunction obtained on anex-parteapplication shall automatically lapse at the end of two weeks from the date on which it is granted.

Miss S. Guna submits on behalf of the first defendant and raises a preliminary objection to the effect that there is no provision under O 29 r 2B of the RHC for the return date to be given before the expiry of the two weeks and if the plaintiff wants the matter to be heard interpartes, enclosure 1A (referring to the ex-parteapplication for an interim injunction) should be served on the defendants. She submits forcefully that the life span of an ex-parteinterim injunction is only for two weeks and since there is no provision for an extension of the life span of an ex-parteinterim injunction, it follows therefore that O 29 r (2B) of the RHC is a mandatory provision.

On the other side of the fence, Mr. A. Selvanathan submits on behalf of the plaintiff that the words appearing in O 29 r (2B) of the RHC especially the words: "Unless sooner revoked or set aside" reflect the need for a return date to be given so as to enable the other side to come to Court and argue it out.

The Rules Committee in its wisdom makes O 29 r 2B of the RHC giving it statutory flavour (Shobri bin Hasan v. r S Ramalingam a/l Subramaniam [1993] 2 MLRH 456, [1993] 1 MLJ 263: 636, and the language employed therein lays down a procedure to be followed, especially in regard to time. Provisions with respect to time are always mandatory unless the Court is given a power of extending the relevant time limit (Transport Amalgamated Pty Ltd. v. AAA Transport Services Pty Ltd.[1975] WAR 101 at 102-103 (W.A. SC) and Christie Sands Pty Ltd. v. City of Tea Tree Gully[1975] 11 SASR 255 at 262-263 (SA SC)). Being procedural in nature, they are said to be usually or prima faciemandatory in character. It is said also that a mandatory requirement has to be obeyed exactly whereas a directory requirement is to be obeyed substantially (see for InstanceEx p Hinds re Penboss[1972] 2 NSWLR 542 at 552).3C It goes without saying and it is frequently said that to determine whether the words employed are to be treated as mandatory or directory one must not forget the advice of Lord Denning M.R. in Sheffield City Council v. Graingers Wines Ltd.[1977] 1 WLR 1119 at page 1122 to the effect that "it is always a matte