Possession of illegal drugs infers knowledge; an 'innocent carrier' defense must provide credible explanations, otherwise, conviction stands.

[10] In the present case, it is not in dispute that the appellant was carrying exh P11 at the material time. In our judgment, since the prosecution had proved the fact that the appellant was in physical control of exh P11 there is a strong inference that the appellant knew all along that exh P11 found on his possession contained the offending drugs. It calls for an explanation by the appellant in order to rebut the said strong inference. Support for this proposition can be found from the speech of Lord Wilberforce in Warner vMetropolitan Police Commissioner [1968] 2 All ER at p 394:

"In all such cases, the starting point will be that the accused had physical control of something - a package, a bottle, a container - found to contain the substance. This is evidence - generally strong evidence - or possession. It calls for an explanation: the explanation will be heard and the jury must decide whether there is genuine ignorance of the presence of the substance, or such an acceptance of the package with all that it might contain, or with such opportunity to ascertain what it did contain or such guilty knowledge with regard to it as to make the statutory possession. "

[11] Our Federal Court also adopted the point made by Lord WilberforceIn PP v. Abdul Rahman bin Akif, [2007] 5 MLJ 1 , in delivering the judgment of the Federal Court, Arifin Zakaria FCJ (as His Lordship then was) agreed with the following speech of Lord Morris in Warner vMetropolitan Police Commissioner:

"If there is assent to the control of a thing, either after having the means of knowledge of what the thing is or contains or being unmindful whether there are means of knowledge or not, then ordinarily there will be possession. If there is some momentary custody of a thing without any knowledge or means of knowledge of what the thing is or contains then ordinarily, I would suppose that there would not be possession. If, however, someone deliberately assumes control of some package or container, then I would think that he is in possession of it. If he deliberately so assumes control knowing that it has contents, he would also be in possession of the contentsI cannot think that it would be rational to hold that someone who is in possession of a box which he knows to have things in it is in possession of the box but not in possession of the things in it. If he had been misinformed or misled of the nature of the contents, or if he had made a wrong surmise as to them, it seems to me that he would nevertheless be in possession of them. "

[12] Coming back then to the present case, it is also our judgment that there was sufficient evidence to support a prima facie finding of trafficking independent of the presumption under s 37(da) of the Act having regard to the definition under s 2 of which defines the offence as:

" 'trafficking' includes the doing of any of the following acts, that is to say, manufacturing, importing, exporting, keeping, concealing, buying, selling, giving, receiving, storing, administering, transporting, carrying, sending, delivering, procuring, supplying or distributing any dangerous drug otherwise than under the authority of this Act or the regulations made under the Act. "

[13] In this instant case, the appellant was apprehended in the act of carrying from one place to another dangerous drugs weighing 14888.5 grammes, which in our view an amount much larger than was likely to be used for his own consumption. That is why, in our view the appellant was not in passive possession of the dangerous drugs in question. In the absence of contradiction or in the absence of any credible explanation, in our judgment, this fact was sufficient to lead to a strong inference that the purpose for which the appellant was in possession of the drugs he was carrying was to transfer the possession of the offe