Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ:

[1] The principal question of law which arose acutely for decision in this appeal was whether the respondent Patco Malaysia Berhad ("the employer") had satisfied the requirements of O 53 r 1(2) of the Rules of the High 1980, when it had obtained leave of the High Court by order dated 22 May 1992, ("the order for leave") to apply for an order of certiorari to remove to the High Court for the purpose of it being quashed, an award of the Industrial Court dated 27 April 1992 ("the award of the Industrial Court") made pursuant to a finding by the Industrial Court that its employee, the first appellant Tuan Haji Sarip bin Hamid ("the employee"), had been dismissed without just cause or excuse and, in consequence, had been ordered to be reinstated as its general manager and paid various financial reliefs with retrospective effect.

[2] An application had then been made by the employee by notice of motion dated 30 June 1992, supported by affidavit, to set aside the order for leave on the ground, inter alia, that there had been non-disclosure of a material fact and non-compliance with the requirements of O 53 r 1(2) of the Rules of the High 1980, but this was dismissed and an order for stay of the award of the Industrial Court ("the order for stay") made. It was against this order of dismissal and the order for stay comprised in the judgment of the High Court dated 26 January 1993, ("the judgment of the High Court dated 26 January 1993") that the employee had appealed to this Court.

[3] At the conclusion of the arguments, we had allowed the appeal with costs here and in the High Court, to the employee, and set aside the judgment of the High Court, dated 26 January 1993, the effect of which was to discharge the order for leave and the order for stay, as well as, to restore the award of the Industrial Court in its entirety. The deposit paid into Court by way of security for costs of the appeal was to be refunded to the employee. We intimated then that we would be giving our reasons in writing for our decision, and this we now do.

[4] First of all, as regards the point about alleged non-disclosure of a material fact, this was fully argued before us and we find it unnecessary to discuss it again. Suffice to say that we found no substance whatever in the point.

[5] Next, we must address the remaining points in this appeal.

[6] To put the matter in perspective, the provisions of O 53, r 1, which it would be convenient to reproduce are these:

1. (1) No application for an order of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari shall be made unless leave therefor has been granted in accordance with this rule.

(2) An application for such leave must be made ex parte to the Court, except in vacation when it may be made to a Judge in Chambers, and must be supported by a statement setting out the name and description of the applicant, the relief sought and the grounds on which it is sought, and by affidavits, to be filed before the application is made, verifying the facts relied on.

(3) The applicant must give notice of the application for leave not later than the preceding day to the Attorney General's Chambers and must at the same time lodge in those Chambers copies of the statement and affidavits.

(4) The Court or Judge may, in granting leave, impose such terms as to costs and as to giving security as it or he thinks fit.

(5) The grant of leave under this rule to apply for an order of prohibition or an order of certiorari shall, if the Court or Judge so directs, operate as a stay of the proceedings in question until the determination of the application or until the Court or Judge otherwise orders.

[7]Order 53, r 3 sets out the manner in which an application for judicial review is made. It provides:

3. (1) Copies of the statement and of the affidavits in support of the application for leave under r 1 must be served with the notice of motion or summons under r 2 and, subject to para (2), no grounds shall be relied upon or any relief sought at