Callow J:

This is a motion to extend the time within which to appeal against an order of the Settlement Officer, Padang Terap, made on the 18 January 1949.

The Order was made in accordance with proceedings under s. 85 of Enactment No. 56 (Lands), hereafter called the Enactment, and the applicant was the Opposer.By s. 85(6) of the Enactment, appeal lies within thirty days; this subsection has to be considered with s. 186 of the Enactment which if certain procedure is followed appears to enlarge the time, for it permits an aggrieved party to seek within thirty days of a decision a certificate of the grounds therefor, and then a further thirty days is granted within which petition may be lodged setting out the grounds of dissatisfaction.

In this case there is no record of any application for grounds of decision, and perhaps none was necessary, for the Settlement Officer concluded a very searching and thorough inquiry by recording what he described as his finding, consequent upon which he made his order.This order by s. 85(5) of the Enactment should be in the form of sch. XII, but this was not exactly followed; however there is no ambiguity and the departure from the approved form does not appear to be fatal.

Thus the appeal period expired 30 days later, that is to say on the 17 February 1949.By Exh. "A" there is evidence that the applicant first gave notice of appeal on 10 February 1949, which was within time, but the necessary fees were not paid and therefore the appeal was not filed and remains unfiled.

On 22 February 1949, the applicant was informed that the appeal period had expired and that she should seek extension of time if she wished to pursue it.

Requirements of translation caused delay until a few days after 4 April 1949, the exact date is not given.

Then on 14 April 1949, the applicant consulted Counsel, but no Advocate fees were forth-coming.In her affidavit the applicant attributed further delay to ignorance of procedure and misunderstanding of the payment of fees, but the truth is that the subsequent delay was on account of non-satisfaction of Advocate's fees.At all events the proceedings were not in Counsel's hands until 15 August 1949, and application for translation was not made until the 24 August 1949.

Now does this history amount to special circumstances such as to render extension of time just (s 186(5) of the Enactment)? The latest possible date following s. 186 of the Enactment, within which appeal lay was the 19 March 1949, that is to say, had procedure been to obtain grounds of decision; as I have observed the grounds in this case were described as a finding and given on the 18 January 1949, together with the order, so here the appeal period expired on the 17 February 1949.The applicant's motion was filed on the 6 September 1949, or approaching seven months after the expiration of the appeal period.

I have had reference to the reported case of Jacobson v. Lee , Weekly Notes dated 22 July 1949, pp 318, 319.In the judgment of Harman J, is stated:

It was important that litigants should not be shut out from their rights, but it was equally important that a litigant who had a judgment in his favour should not have it taken away from him except in very special circumstances.It was in the interest of the public that there should be an end of litigation.In Dunn v. Beausire (unreported, see note in Annual Practice (1948) p. 1249) the Court of Appeal held that mere mistake and hardship were insufficient to justify an application.The question was whether there was here anything more than mere mistake and hardship.

I have also been guided by the case of Manickam v. Tremelbye (Selangor) Rubber Co. Ltd. [1948] 1 MLRH 192, [1949] MLJ 90, in which special circumstances sufficient to render an extension just were considered, and I was much impressed by the citation therein from Re Helsby [1894] 1 QB at p. 746:

Upon the question whether the time ought to be extended, speaking for myself, I am inclined to adopt th