Mohd Azmi FCJ:

The respondent in this appeal has applied by summons in chambers for abridgement of the time required under s. 15(5) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 for posting notices of his petition for admission as an advocate and solicitor. As s. 15(5) does not contain any express provision for abridgement, the respondent grounded his application on the additional power of the High Court as contained in para. 8 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1964 Act') . After hearing arguments, the learned trial Judge in the Court below concluded that the period of posting under consideration is not mandatory but merely directory, and that the High Court has the necessary power to allow the application even though s. 15(5) is silent, both on the power of the Court to abridge or on any prohibition against abridgement. His Lordship went further to say that the words, "or such shorter period as the Court may allow" found in the related ss. 15(3) and 16(1) of the Act were superfluous, for even without these words, time could still be abridged by the Court under the ombudsman judicial power conferred by s. 25(2) read with para. 8 of the Schedule to the 1964 Act . In the exercise of his discretion the learned Judge ordered the three months period of posting to be abridged to one week. The Attorney-General and the Bar Council together with the Bar Committee of Kuala Lumpur are dissatisfied with the said order, but only the Bar Council and Bar Committee have decided to proceed with the appeal.

At the outset of the appeal Mr. Robert Lazar for the Bar Council and Committee makes it abundantly clear that the appellants are purely concerned with the law, and that they are not interested in the merits of the application. By this concession, the Malaysian Bar and the Bar Committee of Kuala Lumpur must be taken to have abandoned their only other ground of appeal, leaving only one ground for argument and determination, namely whether, "the learned trial Judge erred in law in holding that the Court has power to extend or abridge the time period of three (3) months prescribed by s. 15(5) of the Legal Profession Act by virtue of the powers conferred particularly by para. 8 of the Schedule to s. 25(2) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964".

In concluding that the High Court had power and not merely jurisdiction to grant the order of abridgement, the learned trial Judge in his grounds of judgment referred to the provisions of the Second Schedule to the Courts Ordinance 1948, the forerunner of the 42Schedule to the 1964 Act. He argued that para. 8 of the 1964 Schedule was taken from para. 12 of the 1948 Second Schedule, but there was one important distinction, namely the word "jurisdiction" in the 1948 Second Schedule had been substituted throughout with the word "power" not only in the Schedule but also in s. 25 of the 1964 Act. In addition, a new proviso was added to para. 8.

Section 25(2) provides:

Without prejudice to the generality of sub-s. (1) the High Court shall have the additional powers set out in the Schedule:

Provided that all such powers shall be exercised in accordance with any written law or rules of Court relating to the same.

Paragraph 8 states:

Time.

Power to enlarge or abridge the time prescribed by any written law for doing any act or taking any proceeding, although any application therefor be not made until after the expiration of the time prescribed:

Provided that this provision shall be without prejudice to any written law relating to limitation.

By comparison, the relevant provisions under the repealed Courts Ordinance 1948 provided:

Section 47:

The original civil jurisdiction of the High Court shall be as set out in the Second Schedule hereto.

Paragraph 12 Second Schedule :

Jurisdiction to enlarge or abridge the time prescribed by any written law for doing any act or taking any proceeding, although any application therefor be not made until after the expiration of the ti