COLLYER, ACTING C.J.

The terms of the mortgage are that the date of repayment is the 30th June, 1934.

These terms are said to be subject to the provisions of Sections 228 and 230 of the Municipal Ordinance 1887. The provisions of those Sections do not in themselves enable the Municipal Commissioners to redeem any mortgage before the day named therein for repayment.

It appears to me that the words "subject to the provisions of Sections 228 and 230" would not naturally convey to the mind of a mortgage that his mortgage was liable to be paid off before the day named for payment.

It is true that Section 228, which merely gives the Commissioners certain borrowing powers, could not by itself in any way modify the terms of the mortgage. It appears to me however, that the reference to the two sections taken together might reasonably be expected and might have been intended to convey to the mind of the mortgagee that if the Commissioners were unable to pay off all the mortgages at the due date, he might have to wait until money could be borrowed at a lower rate of interest, and his mortgage drawn for repayment.

If the Municipal Commissioners intended that the mortgage should be subject to the very important condition that it might be paid off at any moment when the Commissioners were able to borrow money at a lower rate of interest, they have not used words adapted to express this condition. There would be a declaration that the mortgage bond was repayable on the 30th June, 1934, and no no other date.

From this decision the Municipal Commissioners appealed. The appeal was heard on October 6th and 7th 1898.

Napier for the appellants.

The question was whether the commissioners were entitled to pay off a bond for $500 on February 20th last or not until June 30th 1934. That turned to a great extent upon the constructions of the bond and the material part of the bond was the declaration. "It is hereby declared that subject to the provisions of Sections 228 and 230 of the said Ordinance the principal sum of $500 shall be repaid on the 30th June 1934 at Singapore." The Municipal Commissioners were a corporation created by ordinance and they had no powers other than those which were included in the ordinance which incorporated them that was the Municipal Ordinance 1887. West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Society [1897] 1 Ch. 335, on App. [1897] A.C. 647. Under the Ordinance the Commissioners would be bound to form a sinking fund and they might at any time after giving six months' notice under Section 230 repay any of the mortgages in form C. out of the sinking fund or after reasonable notice which would be six months out of moneys which could be borrowed at a lower rate of interest. As a mortgage had to be in form C. under the ordinance and as the form would have the effect he had stated, any Mortgage which did not preserve those rights of the Commissioners would not be binding or at any rate would not be binding pro lacto.

The Commissioners could not dives themselves of rights which were conferred upon them by the Ordinance. Ayr Harbour Trustees v. Osward 8 App. Ch. 623. The Court in construing the mortgage bond would favour its validity, Steele v. Hoe 19 L.J.Q.B. 89. He submitted that the time for payment was not absolute, and that it was subject to some limitation had been recognized by the plaintiff in this case, because he had accepted payment of one of the bonds before 1934. Further they were bound to give some legal meaning to these words and the only legal meaning they could give was the one he suggested, and the agreement contained in the bond was capable of being construed in conformity with the law in a certain manner, or in the alternative it would be void so far as that proviso was concerned.

W. Nanson for the respondent.

The only question raised in the Court below was whether the Mortgage bond was repayable on February 28th last, or not until 30th June 1934, or on what date. They had nothing whate