was as follows:--

There was ample evidence to justify the finding that the appellant inflicted the wound which resulted in the death of Lim Giap. The substantial defence was that the appellant was provoked by offensive expressions used by Lim Giap, and that he is entitled to rely on the First exception to section 300 of the Penal Code.

It appears that the appellant had an adopted brother Lim Peng who died 3 or 4 years ago. On or before Lim Pengs death Lim Giap seems to have disposed of all Lim Pengs property, and the appellant hearing about this made enquiries as to what had happened to the property, and in particular what the deceased had done with a sum of $ 200, the proceeds of sale of Lim Pengs daughter. Lim Giap said that he had sent it to Lim Hup Ser, Lim Pengs son in China, and that he had received letters acknowledging this sum. On the 3rd October appellant went to Lim Giaps house and asked to see the letters, but Lim Giap put him off and there was a quarrel. The appellant says that Lim Giap used abusive words to him and that he went out on the five-foot way feeling very angry. A few minutes later the appellant returned with a knife in his hand and stabbed Lim Giap. The appellant says that while he was on the five-foot way Lim Giap shouted further abuse at him, but this is not borne out by the evidence of Lim Giaps widow. According to the appellants own story the matter of Lim Pengs affairs was discussed on two or three occasions previous to the 3rd October, and it was proved that on the 1st October the appellant went to a blacksmith and had a special knife made. It was with this knife that Lim Giap was stabbed. The appellant gave no explanation why he wanted this knife made to his special design, and the assessors were entitled to infer that the knife was obtained by the appellant for the purpose of attacking Lim Giap and that accordingly the killing was premeditated. If that was the correct inference, then it would appear that the appellant went to Lim Giaps house on the 3rd October in order to pick a quarrel, and the defence of provocation would fail, as it is specially provided:

"That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the

offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person."

It is now necessary to consider the summary of his summing up made by the learned Judge in his report to the Appeal Court.

The learned Judge quite correctly directed the assessors that the onus was on the prosecution to prove each necessary fact, that the accused must be presumed to be innocent till convicted, and that he must be given the benefit of any reasonable doubt.

The facts which have to be proved to establish a case of murder are (1) that the accused was the person who struck the fatal blow, and (2) that the blow was struck with a criminal intention, as specified in section 300 of the Penal Code. The criminal intention, which in English law is termed "malice," is, as the learned Judge said, a matter of inference to be drawn from all the circumstances of the case.

The law in Johore is as regards the onus placed upon the prosecution in cases of murder the same as in England and has been summarised by Lord Sankey in Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions (1935) AC p 462 in the following passage appearing at page 482.

"When dealing with a murder case, the Crown must prove (a) death as the

result of a voluntary act of the accused and (b) malice of the accused.

It may prove malice either expressly or by implication. For malice may

be implied where death occurs as the result of a voluntary act of the

accused which is (I) intentional and (II) unprovoked."

After dealing with the onus which lies on the prosecution the learned trial Judge then deals with the defence of provocation whereby the offence might be reduced from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The learned Judge proceeds:

"If he alle