In this probate action, the plaintiff, who is the widow of the abovenamed deceased, prays in her petition that probate of the will of the deceased may be granted to her as executrix named in his will. The defendant, who is the deceaseds eldest son by his first wife, opposes the petition on six grounds, which are set out in the defence.

The first ground is that the deceased was not domiciled in Singapore at the time of his death. This was abandoned at the trial.

The second ground is that the date of the alleged execution has not been inserted in the will. The year of the execution is stated in the will to be 1957; but the month and the day of the month have been left blank. Ahmad bin Abdul Razak and Shaik Ali, son of Nagoor Meera, the two attesting witnesses, testified that the deceased signed the will in their presence in Shaik Alis office at No. 4B DAlmeida Street, Singapore, in the month of Ramadhan in 1957. In that year, this month began on the first day of April and ended on the last day of the same month. Both witnesses added that the time of the execution was about 2.30 p.m. I accept their evidence. In my opinion, although they could not remember the exact date, their testimony that the will was executed by the deceased in their presence during the month of Ramadhan in 1957 is sufficient.

It is convenient to consider the fifth and sixth grounds before the third and fourth. The fifth ground is that the testator did not know and fully appreciate and approve of the contents of the alleged will. The plaintiff testified that about two years before his death the deceased told her that he was going to make arrangements for her and her children, and that he would leave a will. She added that one day she told the deceased that his five sons by his first wife were grown up and could earn their own living, and that her children were all young and she asked him what arrangements he was going to make for them. He replied that he had already prepared a will. Both Ahmad bin Abdul Razak and Shaik Ali testified that on the day of the execution of the will the deceased told them that he had written a will for his children. I am satisfied that, although the deceased could not write English and could only sign his name in English, he knew the contents of the will and approved of them.

The sixth ground is that the execution of the will was obtained by the undue influence of the plaintiff. The burden of proving this allegation was on the defendant. The only evidence given in support of this allegation was that whenever the defendant visited the deceased at the deceaseds home at 69 Tras Street the plaintiff would stop talking to the deceased and leave the room; and that this conduct on her part aroused his suspicion. It seems to me that there is no substance in allegation of undue influence.

The third ground is that a Muslim cannot by will dispose of more than a third of the surplus of his estate after payment of funeral expenses and debts; and that testamentary dispositions in excess of the legal third cannot take effect, unless the heirs consent to them after the death of the testator. And the fourth ground is that a testamentary disposition by a Muslim to an heir is not valid unless the other heirs consent to the disposition after the death of the testator; and that any single heir may consent so as to bind his own share. Counsel for the defendant cited Tyabfis Principles of Muhammadan Law, 3rd edition, section 579 in support of both grounds. It is pointed out by counsel that by his will the deceased purported to give all his property to the plaintiff and her children without providing for his five children by his first wife: and that the latter have not consented to the disposition. It is contended that the will is, therefore, invalid in toto.

In my view, the will is entitled to probate, as the testator executed in accordance with the requirements of section 6 of the Wills Ordinance and as he appointed the