Murray-Aynsley CJ:

In this case the appellants were charged and convicted of abetting an offence under s. 161 of the Penal Code.

The petition of appeal set out numerous grounds, some of them going to the merits, others technical.As regards merits, the chief feature of the case is the fact that neither of the prosecution witnesses spoke or understood anything but English; on the other hand, the first and second appellants do not appear to have understood or spoken any English.It appears that the first appellant had killed a person in an accident to a motor vehicle which he was driving.This accident was followed by investigations by the Naval Police in which the second prosecution witness, Morton, was concerned.It appears that the third accused approached the first prosecution witness, Noble, also a Naval policeman but not concerned in the investigation, with a view to contacting Morton with the further object of influencing the latter.The second accused was present.At the first two meetings the second and third accused were present.At a third meeting the first accused was present and handed a sum of $200 to Morton.The defence was that the sum of money handed over was not by way of a bribe but was given at the suggestion of the prosecution witnesses as compensation to the mother of the person killed.This defence was rejected by the learned District Judge and he was perfectly entitled to reject it.

The prosecution witnesses were not accomplices.Therefore it seems that, subject to technical matters to be considered later, the offence, if any, was clearly established as against the third appellant.As regards the first appellant, it is a matter of inference.He was the person who had reasons to placate the police and it was he who handed over the money. I think that the learned District Judge was perfectly entitled to draw the inference that he was taking part in the offence.As against the second appellant, the case was also a matter of inference.He was not concerned in the investigation as was the first appellant.He was, however, present on three occasions.On the second occasion the second and third appellants left the coffee shop when negotiations were being conducted and on their return an offer of money was made by the third appellant.In the circumstances it was necessary to infer that the second appellant was either a stranger to the transaction, for whose presence no reasonable explanation could be given, or that he was taking part in the negotiation.His own evidence showed that he was a go-between the first and third appellants.

I shall now deal with the technical matters. I do not think that any complaint as to the wording of the charge in the final form as being of any substance.The substantial matter of law is based on the finding by the learned District Judge that neither of the prosecution witnesses was in a position to show favour in return for a bribe.On this matter there is a difference of opinion among the Indian Courts on the interpretation of s. 161. I do not understand the restrictive interpretation put on the section by the Madras and Calcutta Courts. I should have thought that illustration (c) clearly negatived it. The essentials of the offence are, being a public servant, the receipt of a reward and the motive.It is explained that "A person who receives a gratification as a motive for doing what he does not intend to do, or as a reward for doing what he has not done, comes within these words (a motive or reward for doing)". In view of this I should have thought that the motive of the giver, if known to the recipient, was sufficient.It is true that in many cases a recipient of a bribe might also be convicted of cheating.

I think that it is also clear that the Naval Police are public servants within the meaning of s. 21 of the Penal Code.

The sentences are not excessive.The appeals are dismissed.

Appeals Dismissed.