Bostock Hill J:

The Plaintiffs in this case are the landlords of the house and premises known as No. 7, Bangkok Lane, Penang, and the Defendant is the sister of a Miss. M K Sledge who became the tenant of the said premises in 1941.

The facts of the case are simple.Miss. Sledge and the Defendant and two other sisters lived together in the said house from 1941 to 1947.The tenancy was arranged by Miss.Sledge with the agent of the Plaintiffs and the rent receipts were given in the name of Miss.Sledge though, apparently, the Defendant contributed towards the rent.

In about the middle of June 1947, Miss.Sledge left Penang for British North Borneo leaving the Defendant and her sisters still living in the house.Very soon after her arrival there Miss.Sledge took up a post with a firm there and she has not been back since.Defendant continued to reside in the house and paid the rent in Miss.Sledge's name i.e. the rent receipts continued to be given in Miss.Sledge's name.

The Plaintiffs were not satisfied with this arrangement as they wanted the house and they attempted to serve Miss.Sledge with a Notice to Quit in November 1947, but it is not known that she ever received it. On 30 January 1948 a Notice to Quit was handed to an adult inmate on the said premises and the Defendant stated that she heard of this but had not actually seen it. A third Notice to Quit, Exh. P1 dated 29 April 1948 was sent by AR registered post to Miss.Sledge in Borneo and an acknowledgment, Exh. P2 of the that Notice to Quit signed by Miss.Sledge as being received on 25 May 1948 has been received.This Notice to Quit expired on 30 June 1948.

Rent was paid by the Defendant in the name of Miss.Sledge up to February 1948 but after that, though tendered, it was refused by the Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant is a trespasser and ask for an injunction to restrain her from continuing to live on the said premises and also claim damages for trespass.The Defendant denies that she is a trespasser and claims that she has remained on the said premises as the agent or licensee of the tenant.

The important point to be decided in the case is whether the tenant is still "in possession" of the said premises.Section 15(a) of the Control of Rent Ordinance, 1948 (No. 6/1948) defines a statutory tenant as "any tenant of premises who remains in possession thereof after the determination by any means of his tenancy and who cannot by reason of the provisions of this Ordinance be deprived of such possession by his landlord."

If Miss.Sledge must be held to be still "in possession" then she is clearly, since the expiry of the Notice to Quit on 30 June 1948, a "statutory tenant" and is entitled to the protection of the Control of Rent Ordinance.

"Possession" under the Ordinance is not defined though its importance with regard to statutory tenancy is again emphasised in s. 16 of the Ordinance.It does not seem to be defined in the similar Acts in England though it appears to be used in the same sense as in the Control of Rent Ordinance, 1948.It is discussed at some length in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Brown v. Draper [1944] 1 KB 309). In that case a husband (the tenant) had after a matrimonial dispute left the premises of which he was tenant.He did not give up possession to the landlord and he left his wife in occupation without taking any steps to revoke the licence which the had given her to continue living there, and he left the furniture in the house in her charge.The Plaintiffs in that case gave the husband a formal notice to quit expiring about one year after the husband left - a time almost exactly the same as the period that elapsed in the present case before the Notice to Quit was served on Miss.Sledge.After that the husband ceased to pay rent.The Court of Appeal, reversing the decision of the learned County Court Judge who had found that the wife was simply a trespasser, held that the husband was still in possession of the house.The Court went on