JUDGMENTBY: TERRELL, AG CJ

In this case the Court is agreed that the Appeal be dismissed.

Among the various points raised so ably by Mr. Braga in this Appeal, there is the very difficult question as to the cases in which evidence of system can be admitted.

In the present case the Court finds that such evidence of previous transactions can be admitted under Sections 14 and 15 of the Evidence Ordinance--the illustrations to Section 14 make that quite clear.

It is not only to rebut the defence of accident that such evidence can be admitted; it can also in a proper case be called to prove a state of mind, to prove criminal intention.

In the case before the Court this evidence was particularly relevant because the accused did not deny that he had made the false entries, he did not deny that he had the money. He said that he made the false entries under the direction of Mr. Vowler and that Mr. Vowler had had the money. So surely it must be relevant to look to previous transactions to see what the previous method of business had been, so as to arrive at a conclusion whether or not that defence would hold water. Is it likely that Mr. Vowler would have asked the accused to falsify various items in the account to the extent of one or two dollars? Still more is it likely that the accused would have continued to falsify the accounts on Mr. Vowlers instructions when Mr. Vowler was not in the country? That is what the accused alleged.

It appears that that was substantially the defence and in order to rebut it this other evidence was absolutely relevant.

There is nothing so far as I can see inconsistent with what I said in the judgment which has been cited in the Malayan Law Journal ( Teo Koon Seng vs Rex 5 MLJ, p 10). It is quite a different case and evidence of an entirely separate transaction had been brought in to prove guilty intention. There was no connection between the two sets of circumstances in that case. The whole issue was whether the accused had attempted to extort money or not. If the Court was satisfied that he had extorted money, no explanation was possible, and it was not permissible to prove that the accused extorted money from A because on an entirely different occasion be had extorted money from B. In this case on the other hand the questions whether the money had been taken and the accounts falsified were not in dispute. The only matter in dispute which the Crown had to satisfy the Jury was the knowledge or intention with which the acts had been done. The Crown were not trying to prove that the accused had committed the particular offences charged, by proving that he had committed similar offences on other occasions. They were anticipating the defence that he was only an abettor, and that the criminal intention which was the essence of the charges alleged, was absent.

As regards sentence, in the opinion of the Court the two sentences of six months rigorous imprisonment are very mild. It is possible that another Court might have thought it better to give twelve months or eighteen months on each charge and make these sentences run concurrently. As it is the total sentence apart from the fine is only twelve months and the Court considers that such sentence should not be interfered with.

Appeal dismissed.

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