Spenser-Wilkinson J:

This was an application by way of an originating motion by one Pritam Singh (hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiff") for relief under the proviso to s. 9(1) of the Registration of Business Ordinance, 1947, against the disability imposed by this section in respect of a business carried on by him under the name and style of K Pritam Singh.

The Order applied for in the motion paper reads as follows:

i. had general relief against the disability imposed by s. 9(1) of the Registration of Business Ordinance, 1947, be granted to the Application on such conditions as to costs and service and publication of notice of this application as the Court may be pleased to order.

ii. That the Order of the Learned Session Judge in Kuala Lumpur Session Court Civil SuitNo. 10/49 be set aside.

iii.That the said Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court Civil SuitNo. 10 of 1949 be further heard and considered on its merits.

iv. That such other relief be granted as to Court seems just.

The application arises out of a civil suit commenced by Pritam Singh in the Sessions Court, Kuala Lumpur in which he claimed the sum of $547.20 being the principal and interest due on a promissory note for $480 signed by the defendant in his favour.In the written statement by the respondent who was defendant in that suit he raised the question of registration by the plaintiff of his business and when the suit came on for hearing before the President he dismissed the plaintiff's claim at the close of the plaintiff's case on the ground that the plaintiff was carrying on a business of money-lending which should have been registered by reason of the facts that the business name adopted was the plaintiff's own name preceded by the initial "K" being that of his father Kashir Singh.

The plaintiff is not appealing against the judgment of the President, though I understand that an appeal was filed and was subsequently withdrawn.However this may be, the judgment of the President is not before me on appeal; and in view of the provisions of ss. 56 of the Courts Ordinance I am of opinion that it cannot be before me by way of revision at the instance of the plaintiff.The section reads as follows:

Where an appeal lies from any decision in any civil matter, and no appeal is brought, no proceeding by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of a party who could have appealed.

I, therefore, have no jurisdiction to grant branches (ii) and (iii) of the order asked for on this motion, and that part of the plaintiff's application must, therefore, fail.

The first part of the application asks for general relief, but there was no evidence before me of any contracts other than the one sued on in the Session Court in respect of which relief is required, and Mr. Ng Kok Thoy agreed that his application was in effect for relief in respect of this particular contract.In regard to this branch of the application two questions arise.The first is whether I have jurisdiction on this application to grant the relief asked for; and the second is whether, if I have jurisdiction, this is a case in which it would be proper for relief to be granted.

On the question of jurisdiction the plaintiff relied principally on the case of In Re Shaer [1927] 1 Ch 355.The headnote of this case reads as follow:

Under s. 8 sub-section 1, of the Registration of Business Names Act, 1916, the Court has power to grant relief from the disability attaching to a contract, through failure of the plaintiff to register under the act, in all proceedings on the contract not only up to judgment but also after judgment has been signed; and the relief so granted is retrospective in effect so as to restore the contract ab initio to the category of contracts enforceable at law and validate all subsequent proceedings in respect of it.

Mr Ng Kok Thoy relied upon this decision as authority for the proposition that relief can always be granted even after a judgement has been given. I think, however, that this view of