Suffian J:

The plaintiff, a Sikkimese, was a teacher with the Brigade of Gurkhas in this country. On 12 October 1960, he went to India on leave from Kluang. On 24 February 1961, he returned from India. That day he was summoned before an officer. He went and saw a Gurkha Major, Lal Bahadur Thapa. There were present then about 11 or 12 officers. An officer pointed to a girl, the defendant, and said that she had accused the plaintiff of having had intercourse with her in his kitchen the day before he had left for India and as a result she was now pregnant. Later that day a Panchayat was held to ascertain the truth of her allegations. There the girl repeated her allegations against the plaintiff. Following the finding of the Panchayat the plaintiff was dismissed summarily by the General Officer Commanding the Brigade of Gurkhas and was ordered to return to India at his own expense within 12 days. He appealed but unsuccessfully. After correspondence with the army authorities, the plaintiff on ll October 1961 filed this suit, complaining that the words:

Karthak had intercourse with me in his kitchen one day before he left for India. As a result I am now pregnant.

Uttered by the defendant at the Gurkha Officers' Mess, Kluang, on the 24 February 1961, before Major Lal Bahadur, two European officers and about seven or eight other Gurkha officers were defamatory of the plaintiff, accusing him:

(a) of being a person unfit to be a Headmaster and/or school teacher in any school;

(b)of rape.

He said that by reason of the defamation he had been brought into public hatred, scandal and contempt and suffered damage to himself. The plaintiff claimed an injunction against the defendant. He also asked for damages for slander and costs. Because of this suit the Army authorities permitted him to remain in the country until after its conclusion, the plaintiff living with his wife who was and still is a teacher employed by the Forces.

I do not think that I shall ever know the whole truth about this case, for, unfortunately, by the time of the hearing, the defendant, an infant, had with her guardian ad litem left the country, apparently for good.

Be that as it may, it is quite clear that at the material time the defendant was about 19 years old and was a pupil at the plaintiff's school and that she did utter the words complained of.

There were many defences pleaded. At the hearing justification was abandoned as the defendant was not available to give evidence. Another defence was that the words complained of were not actionable without proof of special damage. Before the trial the defendant's Counsel gave notice that he would cite Jones v. Jones [1916] 2 AC 481 presumably in support of this defence, but at the hearing he said that if the plaintiff proved that the words were published he would concede that they were actionable per se without proof of special damages. In writing my judgment I came to the conclusion that publication had been proved and I proceeded on the basis that the words published were defamatory of the plaintiff.

At the bearing only one defence was proceeded with, privilege, it being argued that either absolute or qualified privilege applied.

Absolute privilege: Two cases were relied on: Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby [1874- 5], LR 7 E & I App. C p. 744 and Addis v. Crocker [1960] 3 WLR 339. It is for the defendant to prove facts to found this defence of absolute privilege. If the plaintiff was a member of a "visiting force" and if the Panchayat was a "service Court" or a "service authority", then by virtue of s. 3(i) of the Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Enactment, Johore, No. 2 of 1941, in force at the material time, and on the authority of Dawkins case absolute privilege would apply.

Paragraph 1601 of the Queen's Regulations for the Army 1961, provides:

Standing Orders may be issued in relation to the various corps. The OC, a formation, station, unit, or any body of troops may also issue Standing Orders relati