Judicial review does not substitute the court's judgment for that of the tribunal below and maintains that findings of fact based on credibility assessments are binding.

[1] This appeal raises no question of any importance. It concerns an issue that has been dealt with on numerous occasions by this court and by the Federal court. It is whether the High court exercised appellate powers in an application for certiorari and thereby exceeded its judicial review function. The facts relevant to the appeal may be shortly stated.

[2] The respondent was at all material times employed by the appellant as deputy project manager The terms of the respondent's employment became a matter of serious dispute in the proceedings before the Industrial court. It is necessary to outline the stand that each side took on the point.

[3] According to the appellant, the respondent was employed pursuant to an agreement contained in a letter of appointment dated 13 July 1994. This document states that the respondent's employment was for an initial probationary period of six months However, the appellant was dissatisfied with the respondent's performance of his duties and so extended the period of probation for a further period of six months.

[4] The respondent presented quite a different version altogether He contended that he was employed under an oral agreement and not a written agreement. He was not a probationer He was a permanent employee. He was to receive an initial salary of RM3,000 per month. This was to be later revised upwards.

[5] But it is common ground that on 14 July 1995, the appellant summarily terminated the respondent's services The letter of termination is an important document. Shorn of formalities it reads as follows:

Please be informed that your services with the company will no longer be required with immediate effect.

Since our last councilling (sic) session in April you have not taken the necessary steps to improve your work performance and to change your attitude.

As such it is with regret that we have to take the unpleasant decision to terminate your services.

[6] The respondent then lodged a complaint under s 20(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 to the director general of Industrial Relations His complaint was in due course referred by the Minister to the Industrial court. In its statement of reply, the appellant for the first time sought to justify the respondent's termination on the ground of misconduct. In particular, four instances of misconduct were relied upon. The first related to the respondent's habitual absence from work. The second was that he had abused his position by requiring the administrative staff to attend to his personal matters The third instance of misconduct is that the respondent acted in dereliction of duty. Lastly, it was alleged that the respondent had conducted his own private business while in the appellant's employment.

[7] The Industrial court after taking evidence and hearing argument handed down an award in which it found for the appellant. The respondent then took out judicial review proceedings before the High court. The learned judge who heard the application granted certiorari and quashed the award of the Industrial court. He found that the respondent had been dismissed without just cause or excuse. He awarded the respondent arrears of salary from the date of the dismissal until the date of judgment at RM11,000 per month. He also awarded the respondent twelve months salary at RM11,000 per month as compensation in lieu of reinstatement. It is against these orders that the present appeal has been brought.

[8] The complaint that the learned judge exercised appellate power instead of the more limited review power - and this is the main, if not the sole ground pursued before us - necessitates an examination of the award of the Industrial court and the appro