Suffian LP:

We allowed this appeal and now give our reasons.

Mr. M. Samantha Murthi was an army officer. He was also a Barrister having been called by Lincoln's Inn, and so is a "qualified person" for the purpose of admission to the Malayan Bar (s. 3 of the Legal Profession Act, Act 166). He also qualified for admission to the Sarawak Bar. When serving in Sarawak he read in the chambers of Mr. K.C.I. Reddy in Kuching and was in due course admitted to the Sarawak Bar under the Advocates Ordinance of Sarawak, Cap. 110.

Mr. Murthi was born in Penang. After leaving the army he returned to live in Malaya, and with a view to being admitted to the Malayan Bar he began reading Mr. Vijandran's chambers in Kuala Lumpur. So far he has done seven months. Before completing the necessary period, in August 1981 he petitioned the High Court in kuala Lumpur for admission to the Malayan Bar.

The three respondents, namely the Bar Council, Malaya; the Bar Committee, Selangor and Federal Territory; and the Attorney-General opposed the petition.

On 6 February the High Court consisting of three judges upheld the objections of the three respondents and dismissed the petition.

A qualified person may be admitted as an advocate and solicitor in Malaya if he satisfies, among others, two conditions: first, if he "has satisfactorily served in Malaysia the prescribed period of pupillage", Which is 12 months, s. 11(d)and s. 12(2). If the period spent by the appellant in Mr. Reddy's chambers is not counted, then clearly he has not satisfied this requirement. On the other hand if that period is counted, he has. The respondents argued that that period should not be counted. Because of our conclusion on the other objection to be stated in a moment, there is no need for us to deal with this objection.

Secondly, the appellant must "serve his period of pupillage with an advocate and solicitor who is and has been in active practice in Malaysia etc.", s. 13(1). As to this, the objection was that while Mr. Reddy has been admitted to practise as an advocate and solicitor in the High Court, Malaya, he has, however, ceased to so practise since his migration from Malaya to Sarawak where he is and has been practising and has not been in possession of a practising certificate in Malaya after 1963, and that the word Malaysia in s. 13(1)must, it was argued, necessarily mean Malaya, as the Act has not yet been made applicable to those two States, and that accordingly the appellant has not complied with the requirement of s. 13(1), and so the appellant's petition should be rejected, as indeed it was.

Thus the issue here was whether Mr. Reddy who practised in Sarawak was an advocate and solicitor who was or had been in active practice in Malaysia within the meaning of s. 13(1) of the Act, such that he could have been a master of pupils intending to be admitted to the Malayan Bar.

In our judgment, though the Act has not been made applicable to Sabah and Sarawak, since the word Malaysia in s. 13(1)is not defined by the Act, it should be given its ordinary meaning, so as to include Sarawak.

We are fortified in our view by the fact that after Sarawak's entry into Malaysia, s. 4(1) of the Advocates Ordinance of Sarawak as well as s. 4(1) of the Advocates Ordinance (cap. 2) of Sabah was amended by the addition of a new para. (cc) to provide that a person contemplating admission to the Sarawak or Sabah Bar may read in the chambers of an advocate who has been practising "in some part of Malaysia" that is, not only in Sarawak or Sabah, but anywhere in Malaysia, including Malaya. These two amendments were made by the Modification of Laws (Advocates) (Borneo States) Order 1965, published as L.N. 435 of 1965.

It is clear that the intention of the legislature when making these two amendments is to treat Sabah and Sarawak and Malaya as one country for the purpose of pupillage, while maintaining the separateness of the Bars of the three areas.

In our judgment the legislature must be r