1984 MarsdenLR 369
PRIVY COUNCIL
LORD KEITH OF KINKEL, LORD EDMUND-DAVIES, LORD SCARMAN, LORD ROSKILL, LORD TEMPLEMAN
JAMIL HARUN
versus
YANG KAMSIAH MEOR RASDI
APPEAL NO. 4 OF 1983
Decided On : 02-13-84
For the appellant G. Sri Ram (George Warr with him)
For the respondents Jonathan Harvie (R.K. Nathan with him)
Lord Scarman:
The issue in this appeal is as to the amount of general damages to be awarded to an infant plaintiff for personal injuries suffered in an accident for which the defendant admits liability.
On 22 July 1975 Yang Salbiah, then a little girl seven years old (she was born on 10 May 1968), was with her sister at Jalan Gombak, Batu 3 3/4 Setapak when the two of them were run down and injured by a motor bus driven by the defendant. Both girls, acting by their father as next friend, sued the driver alleging that the accident was caused by his negligence. The writ was issued in the High Court on 25 February 1977. The sister (who was the first plaintiff), settled her claim at RM1,000 general damages: her injuries were not serious. But Yang Salbiah had been gravely hurt. Before the accident she was a happy, normal healthy and intelligent child. The accident completely changed her personality. According to a report obtained from her school she was after the accident unable to absorb anything that she was taught: she was "not responsive to anything". The medical evidence was undisputed: she had suffered irreversible brain damage, but her injuries were not such as to prevent her living a normal span of life. Dr. Bala Ratnam, a consultant neurophysician, was consulted in June 1979 with a view to preparing a medical report. He diagnosed severe traumatic cerebral damage. The girl was mentally retarded, unable to control her bladder and bowel functions. He concluded that her disability was permanent and that she would be a liability to her family for the rest of her life; for she would be unable to complete her basic education or learn a useful self-supporting trade.
The trial was on 18 October 1979. Dr. Bala Ratnam was the only witness called by the plaintiff. The defendant called no evidence. There was, however, an agreed statement of facts and a bundle of agreed documents, which included a written report from the school describing with a tragic vividness the difference wrought in this little girl by her accident. The failure to call any witness as to her family background, social circumstances or plans for her upbringing and continuing care has had the inevitable result that the trial Judge and, on appeal, the Federal Court have had to make do with inference where they could have derived a measure of help from evidence. Not unnaturally the defendant has emphasised the lack of evidence and has submitted that no Court may rest its judgment on speculation.
The trial Judge awarded the plaintiff RM75,000 general damages and an agreed sum of RM500 special damages. He ordered what he called (quiet wrongly, as the Federal Court has pointed out) "usual" interest of 6% on the general damages to run from date of service of writ; he awarded 3% interest on the special damages from date of accident.
The plaintiff appealed against the award of general damages. After notice of appeal the trial Judge produced in writing his grounds of judgment. His findings of fact are of crucial importance and need to be set out in his own language. They were:
It was obvious from the evidence adduced that the second plaintiff has suffered very serious brain injury which has turned her into a sub-normal child with permanent mental and physical disabilities. I was satisfied that before the accident she was a normal child with all the expectations of a normal life. The accident caused mental retardation resulting, inter alia in her inability to control her bladder and bowel movements and to benefit from a normal education. It was in evidence that her span of life would be normal and that she would have to be cared for all her life.
He refused to accept the submission of plaintiff's Counsel that in assessing damages he should make separate awards in respect of the three heads of damage and loss which he recognised it was his duty to take into account, namely:
(1) pain and suffering and loss of amenities;
(2) prospective loss of earnings;
(3) cost of future