1980 MarsdenLR 83
FC FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR)
SUFFIAN, LP, RAJA AZLAN SHAH, CJ (MALAYA) WAN SULEIMAN, FJ ABDUL HAMID, FJ & HASHIM YEOP A SANI, J
YAP EE KONG
versus
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
CRIMINAL REFERENCE NO 2 OF 1980
Decided On : 11-17-80
E Joseph Jr (GS Nijhar with him) for the 1st appellant.
RR Chelliak (G Sri Ram and P Vijendran with him) for the 2nd appellant.
Shaik Daud bin Haji Mohamad Ismail (Senior Federal Counsel) for the respondent.
Solicitors: RR Chelliah Bros; Chua Bros & Azzat.
(delivering the judgment of the Court): This was a reference under section 66(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act, 1964 (Revised Act 91). There were many questions posed for this court to answer. However, at the outset of the hearing we decided to confine ourselves to the question of corroboration only and that the hearing to proceed as an appeal as well: see Sim Tiew Bee v Public Prosecutor [1973] 2 MLJ 200; Yue Sang Cheong Sdn Bhd v Public Prosecutor [1973] 2 MLJ 77; and Attorney-General for Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963] AC 349.
The question relevant for our consideration in relation to the first appellant is Question No. 3 in his notice of motion which reads as follows:—
"3. Whether corroboration is provided by proof of consistent statements made out of court before trial?"
The corresponding question in relation to the second appellant is Question No. 3 in his notice of motion, to wit:
"3. Where a person is charged with abetting an offence under section 193 of the Penal Code can the evidence of an accomplice be corroborated by what the accomplice is alleged to have told his wife or his superior officer after the offence had been committed."
The background facts of this case are briefly as follows. One R.K. Menon (a legal practitioner) and Yap Ee Kong (a broker) were charged with abetting the offence of perjury under section 193 of the Penal Code allegedly committed by one Othman bin Ahmad, an immigration officer. What was alleged to be the perjured statement was the statement made in the Magistrate's Court, Johore Bahru, by the said Othman bin Ahmad during the trial of the said Yap Ee Kong on October 15, 1975 and October 22, 1975 for an offence under section 97 of the Road Traffic Ordinance 1958. The statement was that the $10 paid by the said Othman to the said Yap Ee Kong on December 4, 1974 was for "petrol money" and not rental of a vehicle contrary to the statement previously made by the said Othman to the police which was that the $10 was for rental of the vehicle. It is to be noted however that it is not stated anywhere in the records that the said Othman bin Ahmad has ever been convicted under section 193 of the Penal Code. During the prosecution of Menon and Yap the said Othman bin Ahmad gave his evidence on the alleged influence of both Menon and Yap for him "to tell lies in court." In support of his evidence the prosecution called his wife (PW7) to testify to the effect that on his return from court on October 15, 1975 her husband told her that he had told lies in court and that the 1st accused (Menon) had asked him to do so. PW7 further testified that on the following day, i.e. October 16, 1975, Yap came to their house at about 9.30 a.m. and when she asked her husband what was the purpose of the visit, the husband replied that "Yap had asked him to say the same thing" and that he had also told her that Menon had also asked Yap to tell him (Othman) to say the same. Another witness brought by the prosecution to support Othman's evidence was Othman's superior officer (PW4). According to PW4 Othman came to see him some time in October 1975 (in fact one week after the trial) and said that he had given evidence in court contrary to the statement he made earlier to the police and that he had done so because he was directed by a lawyer "one Mr. Menon to give false evidence."
According to the judgment of the learned President who heard the case (at page 69 of the record) he warned himself of the danger of acting on the uncorroborated evidence of PW5 (Othman bin Ahmad) whom he regarded as an accomplice. However, on the strength of what he called "supportive evidence" of PW7 (the wife) coupled with "other relevant evidence" he made a finding that a prima facie case was established against both Menon and Yap in respect of the 1st and 3rd charges. The defence called 8 witnesses including the complainant himself and PW7. After hearing the defence the learned President held that in the light