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1980 MarsdenLR 512

KUALA LUMPUR (FEDERAL COURT)

SUFFIAN, LP, CHANG MIN TAT, J & ABDUL HAMID, FJJ


PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
versus
LEONG KUAI HONG

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 28 OF 1980

Decided On : 12-09-80

Advocates:
Lamin bin Haji Mohamed Yunus (Deputy Public Prosecutor) for the appellant.
Karpal Singh (YN Ngeow with him) for the respondent.
Solicitors: Karpal Singh & Co.

Suffian LP

(delivering the judgment of the Court): The main issue in this appeal is whether or not the two home-made hand grenades proved to have been in the control of the respondent contrary to section 57(1)(b) of the Internal Security Act, 1960 ("the Act") were ammunition within section 2 of the Act.

The learned trial judge decided that they were not and acquitted and discharged the respondent, and the learned Public Prosecutor appeals from that decision.

Staff Sergeant Duraisingam of the Second Engineers Squadron who was in charge of booby traps and engineering works, with others from the Bomb Disposal Unit, went to the scene to retrieve and neutralize the grenades. In evidence he said that the grenades, which were home-made, could not explode as they did not contain explosive, but that he still called them hand grenades because they had four parts, namely striker, percussion cap, safety fuse and detonator.

There was no definite finding by the learned trial judge as to whether or not the grenades had these four parts, though he did mention them in his judgment; but as there was no cross-examination on them, it may be taken as a fact that they did have them. Ammunition is defined by section 2 of the Act as meaning three things, as is clear if the definition is re-arranged as follows:

(a) it means ammunition for any fire-arm as hereinafter defined;

(b) it includes grenades, bombs and other like missiles whether capable of use with such a fire-arm or not; and

(c) it includes any ammunition [including grenades] containing of designed or adapted to contain any noxious liquid, gas or other thing.

It will be noted that the definition does not refer to component parts of the objects therein — in contrast to the definition of fire-arm in the same section. That definition reads:

"fire-arm means any lethal barrelled weapon of any description etc …, and includes any component part of any such weapon as aforesaid."

That definition is identical with the definition of the same word in the Emergency Regulations, 1948; and our predecessor, the Court of Appeal, indicated in Ismail bin Haji lbrahirn v Pttblic Prosecutor[1949] MLJ 139 in what circumstances a person may be found guilty of carrying a fire-arm contrary to regulation 4(1)(a) of the regulations, though he carried only parts thereof.

The definition of ammunition may also be contrasted with the definition of explosive as meaning, inter alia, any apparatus, machine, implement or material used for causing any explosition and"any part of any such apparatus, machine or implement."

The instant case was tried under the Essential (Security Cases) Regulations, 1975, P.U.(A) 320 of 1975, as amended by P.U.(A) 362 of the same year; and regulation 21(6) thereof again provides that a fire-arm and explosive include any component part thereof. Regulation 21(6) reads:

"In a security case in which firearm or explosive is the subject matter of the charge or was used in the commission of the offence, such firearm or explosive shall be deemed at the time of the offence to have been in serviceable condition or otherwise capable of being used for the purpose for which such firearm or explosive is designed; and for the purpose of this regulation, a firearm or explosive includes any component part thereof."

Be it noted there is no provision in this regulation — made as recently as 1975—that a grenade includes its component parts.

In our judgment, the contrast between the definition of ammunition on the one hand and of fire-arm and explosive on the other, points to a clear intention on the part of the legislature that in the case of a grenade there must be proof that it must be a complete grenade and that it must at any rate contain explosive, in which event it is unnecessary to prove its serviceability. The fact that when thrown it misfires because for instance the explosive is damp, is immaterial, Chong Kim Seng v Public Prosecutor [1949] MLJ 109.

The learned judge's decision in the instant case is, u

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