(delivering the judgment of the Court): This is an appeal from a decision of Harun J. quashing an award of the Industrial Court ordering the reinstatement of four employees who had been dismissed by their employer Craigielea Estate, Bukit Pasir, Muar.

There was a strike by the union to which the employees belonged and they joined in the strike.

On April 9, 1974, the employer informed the four employees in writing that as they had been absent from work without lawful or reasonable excuse for more than two consecutive days from April 1, 1974, the estate had terminated their employment.

The employees maintained that they had been wrongfully dismissed. The matter was referred to the Minister, but there was no settlement. So the Minister referred the matter to the Industrial Court under section 7(2) of the Industrial Relations Act, 1967 ("the Act") by letter dated August 6. That letter reads:

"I am to inform you that the Ministry has received a complaint [from the four employees] about their dismissal by the [estate].

Because the efforts of the Ministry to settle the dispute have failed, the Minister refers it to the Industrial Court under section 7(2) (of the Act) for determination."

The reference was heard by the Industrial Court on February 24 to 27, 1975 and on March 31 the court handed down their award ordering reinstatement of the four employees.

The estate was on December 8, 1973, granted leave to move the High Court for an order of certiorari to remove to it for the purpose of its being quashed the Industrial Court's award.

The estate argued — as can be seen from the affidavit in support sworn by Mr. Davidson, the estate's planting adviser — that the Industrial Court had made various errors in law and exceeded its jurisdiction.

The application to quash was eventually heard by Harun J. on February 17, 1975, who on the same day granted the order and quashed the award, despite section 29(3)(a) of the Act.

The employees have appealed to us arguing that the Industrial Court in making its award was acting within its jurisdiction and had not exceeded it and therefore the High Court had no jurisdiction to quash the Industrial Court's award.

Mr. Nathan for the employer on the other hand argued that the Industrial Court had committed errors in law and or had exceeded its jurisdiction so that the High Court had power to quash its award and did right to do so.

The issue here is whether or not the High Court had jurisdiction to quash the Industrial Court's award.

The answer to this question turns on the construction of section 29(3)(a) of the Act which at the material time read:

"Subject to this Act, an award of the Industrial Court shall be final and conclusive, and no award shall be challenged, appealed from, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court."

At one time there were conflicting High Court decisions on the meaning of this section. But any doubt on the meaning has since been resolved by the Privy Council in South East Asia Fire Bricks Sdn Bhd v Non-Metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing Employees Union & Ors [1980] 2 MLJ 165, a decision delivered only on June 24, 1980, after the decision appealed from herein.

In Fire Bricks their Lordships held:

(1) that section 29(3)(a) prohibited the High Court from quashing an award of the Industrial Court by certiorari proceedings, if it acted within its jurisdiction and merely made an error of law on the face of the record which did not affect its jurisdiction;

(2) but the section did not prohibit the High Court from quashing such an award

(i) if the Industrial Court acted without jurisdiction; or

(ii) if it exceeded its jurisdiction.

Where a tribunal is entitled to enter on the enquiry in question, i.e. it has jurisdiction to entertain the enquiry, nevertheless its decision may be a nullity so that it may be quashed by an order of certiorari, because it has done or failed to do something in the inquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. Lord R