This is an appeal against the senior assistant registrars (the SAR) decision in allowing the defendants application to strike out the words amounting to RM30m (encl 23) appearing in paras 1 and 2 of the indorsement on the writ of summons and para 14(1) and (2) in the statement of claim. The defendants in Civil Suit No S4-23-44-96 are also seeking to strike out the words amounting to RM15m appearing in paras A(1), (2), B(1) and (2) of the indorsement on the writ of summons and paras 15(1) and (2) of the statement of claim (encl (7)).

Both applications for striking out were made under the provisions of O 18 r 19(1)(b) and (c) of the Rules of High Court 1980 (the RHC), vis-a-vis:

(1) that the said words are scandalous, frivolous and/or vexatious; or

(2) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action.

The defendants raised a preliminary issue before the SAR that this court had decided in the earlier case of Sri Kuala Lumpur v Dian Lai (S4-23-113 of 1996, unreported) ( Sri Kuala Lumpur s case) to the effect that general damages should not be quantified.

The defendants main contention was that the amount of damages as stated in the indorsement of the writ of summons and statement of claim is excessive and should not be quantified, while the plaintiffs maintained that there are no specific statutes and case laws which prohibit the quantification of damages.

Incidentally, it was agreed between the parties that my decision in this appeal will be followed in a similar application in two other suits, that is Suit Nos 23-39 of 1996 and S4-23-44 of 1996.

The plaintiffs present suit is one of defamation. It was the plaintiffs submission that the amount of general damages should be quantified for the following reasons:

(i) The relevant statutes that govern such applications do not prohibit

the quantification of damages. They are, namely, the Defamation Act 1957 and

the RHC. There is not even a practice direction in this country which

prohibits plaintiffs from quantifying the general damages sought. Therefore,

the plaintiff was entitled to plead a specified amount.

(ii) There are case laws which support the plaintiffs contention that

damages can be quantified. He then cited the following authorities, namely:

(a) Chattell v Daily Mail Publishing Co (Ltd) (1901) TLR 165

This was an action for libel, whereby the plaintiff claimed damages in the amount of £1,000. It was held:

The statement of claim in the action claimed £1,000 damages, and

no defence being delivered, interlocutory judgment was signed,

and the question as to the amount of damages was tried before the

Under-Sheriff and a special jury. The jury returned a verdict for

the plaintiff for £2,500. The plaintiff thereupon without

amending the statement of claim signed judgment for this amount.

The defendants applied for a new trial upon the ground that the

damages were excessive.

Rustom K Karanjia & Anor v Krishnaraj Thackersey AIR 1970 Bom 424

The plaintiff claimed general damages of Rs3m on the ground that he had been injured in his character, credit, reputation and in the way of his business and had been brought into public hatred, contempt and ridicule. On appeal by the first and second defendants, the appeal was partly allowed, the decree of the trial court was confirmed with the only modification that for the amount of Rs3m, Rs1.5m would be substituted.

(c) Drane v Evangelou & Ors [1978] 2 All ER 437

This was a claim for damages against the defendant for a tortious act. This matter was taken up to the Court of Appeal whereby the damages awarded by the court below was upheld. But the Court of Appeal did not comment on the quantification of damages. Even though this was not a direct case on libel but on tort, it can be applied by analogy as defamation is a tortious act.

(c) Odgers Principles of Pleadings and D