JUDGMENT

Denis Ong J:

By an ex parte notice of originating motion dated 18 March 1994 and filed on 28 July 1994, the applicant abovenamed, applies to the court for leave to issue certiorari to remove into this court, Industrial Court Award No. 53 of 1994 given on 6 February 1994 in Industrial Court Case No. 4/4-336/89 for the purpose of quashing the said award.

Three grounds upon which the relief sought were contained in the statement dated 19 March 1994 made pursuant to O. 53 r. 1(2) of the Rules of the High Court 1980. An affidavit sworn by Catherine Lau on 18 March 1994 was filed in support of the motion.

At the first hearing on 4 November 1994, I took the view that Margaret Wong Kee Sieng should be cited as the respondent in the motion and directed that a copy of motion be served on her so that she could be heard at the resumed hearing as a party. This direction was complied with. On 31 December 1994, Mr Cheng Hui Hong, learned counsel for Margaret Wong, filed an affidavit of the same date.

At the resumed hearing on 6 January 1995 learned counsel for the applicant Mr HC Sim tendered a written submission which was admitted to from part of the record and marked encl. (19).

Award No. 53 of 1994 is a ruling in writing (exh. CL2) of the Industrial Court on a preliminary point as to the jurisdiction of such court to hear and determine Industrial Court Case No. 4/4-336/89 taken by the "company" (applicant herein) at the outset of the hearing fixed for 28 September 1993. The ruling was a reserved ruling handed down on 6 February 1994 as Award No. 53 of 1994. The present application for leave to issue certiorari is thus to quash such ruling and not to quash an award determined by the Industrial Court on the merits. It is a fact that no evidence was adduced yet by the "claimant" (the respondent herein) before the Industrial Court in support of her case.

Although three grounds were given in the statement pursuant to O. 53 r. 1(2), it is apparent that grounds one and three are incidental to ground two which is the main one.

Mr Sim drew attention that prayers (1), (2) and (3) listed under the section "B decision pray for" at p. 5 of the statement of case marked exh. CL1 and the penultimate paragraph under that same section should be read together. So read, he submitted that it is obvious that the claimant does not want reinstatement but pretended to want or be permitted to carry on the fiction that she wants reinstatement in order to maintain a claim for damages. He pointed out that the Industrial Court directed its mind only to the penultimate paragraph but not the prayers expressly asked for and that was where it had erred in law. He cited Holiday Inn, Kuching v. Lee Chai Siok Elizabeth [1992] 1 CLJ 141; [1992] 2 CLJ (Rep) 521 and submitted that where the claimant did not want the job back, the Industrial Court would have no more jurisdiction to deal with the reference or matter before it. He further submitted that where the claimant was only interested in damages and not reinstatement, then her remedy was a claim on common law.

Mr. Cheng submitted that although reinstatement was not specifically prayed for, it is included in the 3rd prayer which asks for "any other order the court deems fit and proper in the circumstances". He said the omission is not fatal and even if it was not specifically asked for, under s. 30(6) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (Act 177) it was still open to the Industrial Court to order reinstatement or compensation in lieu of reinstatement as it deems fit.

In my view, reinstatement in her former employment like specific performance is a specific relief which must be expressly prayed for in the statement of the case if it is desired: see Industrial Court Rules 1967 r. 9(3)(b). That is a point of procedure. It is not one that could be said to be included in prayer 3 of the statement of the case which is meant for order(s) incidental to prayers (1) and (2). It is a fact that reinstatement is not expressly prayed for