(delivering the Judgment of the Court): The appellant was convicted at the Ipoh Assizes for murder in contravention of Section 302 of the Penal Code. The jury returned a majority verdict of guilty by 5 to 2. The charge against him was that on July 20, 1978 at about 7.00 a.m. at an unnumbered house, Batu 13 Segari, in the District of Dindings, Perak, he murdered one Beah Seai Chia, the wife of his employer. The case has a history of a misunderstanding between the husband of the deceased Lai Kuan Chuei (P.W.4) and the appellant relating to the intended sale of one of the two boats belonging to P.W.4 which the appellant had been using for fishing at sea on a profit-sharing basis between the two. P.W.4 wanted to dispose of the boat because the business was running at a loss. The appellant wanted compensation from P.W.4, because he would be deprived of his job. An argument arose about two days before the incident at P.W.4's house when the appellant came with his employee to see P.W.4 relating to the above. At the time of the incident, P.W.4 was out at sea. Only two people knew about the incident apart from the deceased, viz., the appellant and the son of P.W.4 and the deceased, Lai Hai Heng (P.W.17) who was about six years old when he witnessed the whole incident. There were two different versions as to the manner in which the killing took place, although there was no dispute as to the identity of the appellant as the man who killed the deceased. The learned Judge rightly directed the Jury on the principles of law relating to the testimony of a child and the requirement of corroboration by independent evidence. He also touched on the cautioned statement of the appellant which was admitted as evidence for the prosecution. He brought to the attention of the Jury the cardinal principle of law that where several facts disclosed by the prosecution contradict one another, the facts more favourable to the accused should be accepted. In other words, he brought home to the Jury that the statement of the appellant was to be accepted. Up to that stage, the summing-up, in our considered judgment, was well presented, the learned Judge having touched on the facts adequately. Nevertheless, the conviction was attacked in that the summing-up was defective on several grounds. In our view, the crucial ground was whether the learned Judge had adequately directed the Jury on the alternative verdict of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In discussing the defence, the Judge said, inter alia, on page 104 of the Record:

"As I understand the whole defence, if it is an accident of (or?) private defence, then you must return a verdict of not guilty. If it is grave and sudden provocation, then you reduce the charge to culpable homicide not amounting to murder."

Further on page 105, he continued:

"Subject to what I have already said, there are three possible verdicts in this case. The first verdict is guilty of murder. If you are satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused slashed the deceased with the intention of causing her death and the defence has raised no doubt, then you must return a verdict of guilty of murder. The second verdict is a verdict of not guilty. You will return this verdict if you find that the wounds were inflicted in self-defence. The third verdict is that if you find that the defence has raised grave and sudden provocation, then you reduce your finding to one of guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. And you do this, members of the jury, by having regard to the evidence that was adduced in this Court and treating the evidence on a reasonable basis and relevant basis."

It is clear that only two types of defence were brought to the Jury's attention, viz., the exercise of the right of self-defence (private defence) and whether there was grave and sudden provocation which is Exception 1 to section 300 of the Penal Code.

It was submitted that the Jury had the advantage of considering onl