Arifin b. Zakaria JC:

These two cases, which relate to offences under s. 3 and s. 3A of the Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act 1971 (the Act), were transmitted to the High Court by the learned President of the Sessions Court, Kota Bharu, purportedly acting under s. 11(1) of the Act. The preliminary issue raised at this stage is whether the learned President was right in making the said order of transmission.The answer to this question turns on the interpretation of s. 11(1) of the Act, which for convenience is set out below:

11(1) Where any case in respect of an offence under this Act is required by the public prosecutor to be tried by, the High Court, the accused person shall be produced before the appropriate subordinate Court which shall, after the charge has been explained to him, transmit the case to the High Court without holding a preliminary inquiry under Chapter XVII of the Criminal Procedure Code, and cause the accused person to appear or be brought before such Court as soon as may be practicable. (Emphasis added).

The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor contended that, on a literal interpretation of the said section, it clearly covers all offences under the Act, including those under ss. 3 and 3A of the Act, in respect of which a requisition had been issued by the public prosecutor.This seems to be the impression that may be derived from the said section if one were to read the section in isolation.But, "a statute is to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute" (See Canada Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. R [1898] AC 735 per Lord Davey at p. 741). Similar sentiment was expressed by Sankey J. in Attorney General v. Brown [1920] 1 KB 773 where at p. 791 he said:

... in construing an Act of Parliament it is, in my view, legitimate to consider

(1) the state of the law at the time the Act of Parliament was passed and the changes it was passed to effect; (2) the sections and structure of the Act of Parliament as a whole.

In this connection, the relevant section to consider, in my view is s. 10 of the Act, which is in the following terms:

10(1) Notwithstanding any other written law to the contrary, a Sessions Court shall have jurisdiction to try all offences under this Act, except offences under s. 3 or 3A, and to impose for any offence so tried the full punishment or penalty provided for that offence by this Act, except the penalty of death.

10(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1), the High Court shall have jurisdiction to try any case in respect to any offence under this Act, if the public prosecutor requires any such case to be tried by the High Court. (Emphasis added)

This section, speaks of two types of cases namely, cases triable by the Sessions Court and cases triable by the High Court.An offence under s. 3 or 3A is, by implication only triable by in the High Court.Section 10(2) confers jurisdiction on the High Court to try any case in respect of any offence under the Act if the public prosecutor requires any such case to be tried by the High Court.Even though s. 10(2) speaks of "any offence under the Act" but on its proper construction, it could only relate to cases triable by the Sessions Court.For, it is superfluous to confer on the public prosecutor a discretion to require a case to be tried in the High Court when the case is, without such a requisition, already triable by the High Court.

Construing s. 11(1) of the Act, in the light of s. 10, it would appear that the requisition under the said s. 11(1) only relate to cases triable by the subordinate Court: it could not, possibly relate to a case under ss. 3 or 3A of the Act, since, such a case is already triable by the High Court by virtue of s. 10(1) of the Act.

In support of the above proposition, it may be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Dangerous Drug Act 1952 (DDA) , which are in pari materia with s. 11 of the Act.