Suriyadi Halim Omar J:

The 1st and the 2nd plaintiffs are the current directors of EMAR Sdn. Bhd., the 3rd plaintiff. The 3rd plaintiff which is involved in the development of a housing estate known as Taman Maju Jasin had obtained financial assistance from Perwira Habib Bank Berhad. Securities in the form of debentures were also given. Due to some financial problems the defendants were appointed as receivers and managers on 15 June 1987, managing the business of the company from the date of their appointment (hereinafter referred collectively either as 'the defendants' or 'just the receiver' (singular)). The plaintiffs later wrote to the bank with the intention of finding out the current position of the company's account but unfortunately received no response. To cut the matter short, the plaintiffs initiated this litigation, praying inter alia that monies received by the defendants as agents of EMAR Sdn. Bhd. be paid to the latter and that accounts be supplied to the plaintiffs.

On 4 April 1997 the Senior Assistant Registrar heard Encl. 46, a summonsin-chambers application by the defendants for an order under O. 18 r. 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980. The application strove to strike out the plaintiffs' writ of summons and amended statement of claim on the grounds that they:

a) disclosed no reasonable cause of action; and/or

b) are scandalous, frivolous and/or vexatious; and/or

c) an abuse of the process of the court.

Having heard the submissions of both parties the Senior Assistant Registrar allowed the application and struck off the writ of summons and the amended statement of claim. The plaintiffs have now come before me to appeal against that decision. This appeal has come by the conduit of O. 56 r. 1 whereby an appeal shall lie to a judge in Chambers from any judgment, order or decision of the Registrar. Since this decision emanated from the Senior Assistant Registrar, the appeal therefore is an actual rehearing and I have to treat it as if I am hearing it the first time. I will not be fettered or shackled by the views of the Registrar. As Lord Atkins in Evans v. Bartlam [1937] 2 All ER 646 at 648 said:

I wish to state my conviction that, where there is a discretionary jurisdiction given to the court or a judge, the judge in Chambers is in no way fettered by the previous exercise of the master's discretion. His own discretion is intended by the rules to determine the parties' rights, and he is entitled to exercise it as though the matter came before him for the first time.

He will, of course, give the weight it deserves to the previous decision of the master, but he is in no way bound by it.

(see also Tuan Haji Ahmed Abdul Rahman v. Arab-Malaysian Finance Berhad [1996] 1 CLJ 241 ; Majlis Perbandaran Melaka Bandaraya Bersejarah v. Chin Nyok Lin, Pentadbir Harta Pesaka Loke Yoon Hing @ Loke Yoon Heng, Simati & 3 Ors. [1996] 2 AMR 2138).

With that platform in mind I now proceed with the rehearing of Encls. 2 and 53. A first sight will show that aside from the file being thick, eventhough still at the early stages, the numbering of the enclosures are rather erratic and far apart. Had I not been privy to the history of this case I certainly would have been intimidated by these unusual factors. The records will show that my involvement began with the hearing of Encl. 18 on 19 March 1996 when the defendants prayed that the plaintiffs' action be dismissed with costs. At the end of the hearing I made the necessary orders. In the afternoon when I was about to proceed to hear another application ie, Encl. 3 which was the plaintiffs' application under O. 43 r. 1, both parties by consent agreed that Encl. 4 be converted as a statement of claim and the defendants be at liberty to file a defence within two weeks. By consent too the order I made in the morning pertaining to Encl. 18 was vacated.

It would appear from the records that the statement of claim had also gone through the process of reamendment with th