By summons in chambers, the plaintiff sought to strike out certain paragraphs of the defence of the defendant and to enter final judgment 'for the sum of RM470,750 as prayed in prayer (6) of the statement of claim with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the writ of summons till judgment, and at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of judgment till final payment, and costs to be taxed, including the costs of this application.' The application is made based on all the grounds stated in O 18 r 19(1) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 ('the RHC'), and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. In the first place, upon the perusal of the statement of claim of the plaintiff issued on 7 April 1993 there is no prayer (6) in the said statement which by this application the plaintiff wants the judgment to be entered upon. The statement of claim contains prayers for:

(a) special damages in the sum of RM334,302.58 and the sum of RM75,750;

(b) alternatively, restitution of the sum of RM395,000 and the sum of RM75,750;

(c) general damages;

(d) exemplary damages;

(e) interest on the damages at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the writ summons to final payment;

(f) further or other relief; and

(g) costs.

Therefore, it is not quite clear as to how the plaintiff arrived at the figures as contained in his prayer to this application. The affidavit in support is of no assistance either. Be that as it may, at the commencement of the hearing of this application of the plaintiff, the learned counsel for the defendant raised a preliminary objection relating to this application. It is the contention of the defendant that this court should not entertain this purported striking out application at this very late stage of the proceedings in the suit, as before this application was made, the order on the summons for directions had been given and the plaintiff had in the meanwhile taken steps to notify the setting down of the action for trial. The learned counsel cited Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor v Lorrain Esme Osman [1987] 2 MLJ 633 in support of the contention which states that such an application must be refused after the action has been set down for trial. He also cited my own dicta in Datuk (Datu) Amir Kahar bin Tun Hj Mustapha v Tun Mohd Said Keruak & Ors [1994] 3 MLJ 737 at p 742 as follows:

In a writ action, various interlocutory stages precede the setting down of a case for hearing and in between this period, the parties would have ample opportunity to scrutinize the pleadings and to consider other available evidence in the meantime before making a decision whether to file such a nature of application. Therefore, it is proper that if the application is made after the action has been set down for trial, the application must be refused.

I said this in comparison to an application to strike out an originating summons made soon after the hearing date had been fixed where there was to be no such protracted procedures to follow as so found in the writ action.

The rule does not specify a time limit during which a party may apply to the court to strike out a pleading. But the application should be made promptly and as a rule before the close of the pleadings. The court, however, may allow an application to be made even after the pleadings are closed. But such an application must be refused after the action has been set down for trial.

The plaintiff is given, by the rule, a period of one month after the pleadings are deemed to be closed to take out a summons for directions. This he must do as otherwise the defendant may do so or apply for an order to dismiss the action pursuant to O 25 r 1(4). But in the meanwhile the plaintiff was waiting for the further and better particulars from the defendant. If this fact was before the court upon the hearing of the summons for directions, the consideration by the court upon the summons could reasonably be adjourned to another date pending the sup